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I. INTRODUCTION
"It is the highest masterpiece of legislation to know how to place
properly the judicial power." Baron de Montesquieu
One recurring theme of administrative law concerns the scope of
the adjudicatory role to be played by the administrative agency. For
thirty years, the Florida Administrative Procedure Act has utilized the
independent powers of administrative law judges (ALJs) t as an
institutional check on the exercise of adjudicatory power by agencies.
This article contrasts the statutory provisions governing ALJs and
their orders in the Federal and Florida Administrative Procedure
Acts. It reviews the historical development of the two schemes,
examines the underlying philosophical premises of each, and briefly
considers the dynamics of these two different administrative law
systems.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act was the statutory
synthesis of the progressive, pragmatic thesis of Roosevelt's New
Deal and the conservative legal response to that proposition.' Part II
of this article contains a brief review of this federal administrative
law history. It first describes the classical model of administrative
law which predominated from the founding of the nation and which
was subsequently challenged by the New Deal's "constitutional
revolution."3  Special attention is given to the philosophical battle
1. Federal ALJs were initially denominated "hearing examiners." The Civil
Service Commission bestowed the title "administrative law judge" in 37 FR 16787
(1972); the change was codified in statute by Pub. L. No. 95-251, 2(a)(1) in 1978.
See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2004). The independent adjudicators set up in Florida's
central panel were initially called "hearing officers." See FLA. STAT. ch. 120.65
(Supp. 1974) but were re-designated as "administrative law judges" by Chapter 96-
159, Laws of Florida. For convenience, all will be referred to here consistently as
administrative law judges, or ALs.
2. Roosevelt's "New Deal" was neither the singular source nor the exclusive
era for political and legal change in administrative government, but it did represent
significant change compressed into a relatively short period. In addition to political
compromise, the 1946 APA represented a restructuring of legal theory. An
excellent article highlighting the political battle is George B. Shepherd's Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics,
90 N.w. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996). Several articles have described the change in
constitutional theory highlighted during these years. See e.g., Richard Stewart,
Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHIC. L. REV. 335, 337 (1990).
3. Stewart, supra note 2, at 337.
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involved with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) in 1946. This legislation was a compromise between those
proclaiming a realistic need for agency expertise and the concerns of
those decrying the destruction of a government of separated powers.
4
The Federal APA's creation of independent administrative law
judges and statutorily prescribed judicial review confirmed a new
procedural model of administrative law.
Florida's original 1961 APA had few limitations on agency
exercise of adjudicatory power, but when Florida's Act was rewritten
in 1974, its drafters were not entirely pleased with either the earlier
Act's performance or the compromise that had been achieved at the
federal level.5 Part III discusses how the new APA which emerged in
Florida represented a deliberate readjustment of the federal approach
to reflect these concerns. The state returned to certain principles of
the classical model of administrative law and chose to create a
balance of power more restrictive of agency prerogative. Florida
created one of the earliest central panels, granted its administrative
law judges final order authority in rule challenge cases, and
bifurcated agency authority with respect to treatment of
recommended orders. 6 This innovative approach was intended to
preserve legitimate agency policy expertise but at the same time
provide a more substantial check on the exercise of adjudicatory
power by the agency.
Broader comparisons and analysis of the structure and dynamics
of the federal and Florida systems are made in Part IV. The Federal
Act, consistent with the procedural model, is characterized as
judicially driven and emphasizing great deference to administrative
agencies. The Florida approach, reflecting elements of the classical
model, is seen as legislatively driven, providing checks on agency
power.
Part V concludes that Florida's system provides a balance of
power among the institutions of government different than that at the
4. The compromise achieved was largely a victory for the New Deal
pragmatists, with minor concessions to the defenders of the classical model. See
infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
5. For a more general discussion of models of administrative law and premises
of the 1974 Florida APA and later reform efforts, with a particular discussion of
appellate standards of review, see F. Scott Boyd, A Traveler's Guide for the Road
to Reform, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 247 (1994).
6. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 120.50 (1974).
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federal level and encourages consideration of the balance of power
implications of administrative adjudication schemes in other
jurisdictions.
II. FEDERAL HISTORY
"I thought the law was founded upon reason, and I and others have
reason as well as the judges." King James I
The evolving structures of federal administrative law are most
easily described with reference to some conceptual administrative
7 8law models. The first, the classical model, lasted from the
beginnings of American administrative law until the 1930's, when the
second, the procedural model, 9 became ascendant.' 0 The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act is an embodiment of the procedural
model, and its history is intertwined with the history of this
transition.
7. Numerous commentators have suggested typologies to help explain the
historical evolution of federal administrative law. See generally KENNETH DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, 2 (3d ed. 1972) (describing four stages as
constitutionalism, judicial review, proceduralism, and informal discretion); Richard
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669
(1975) (describing transmission belt theory, traditional theory, and interest group
theory); Sidney Shapiro & Richard Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for
Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 388 (1987) (describing three stages as
structuralism, proceduralism, and rationalism). There was quite a bit of
commentary written in the 1970's and 1980's discussing the early models. See
Ronald Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REV. 363, 364 (1986).
8. See infra note 27.
9. See infra note 91.
10. Although the APA embodied the procedural model, the 1930's are more
accurately identified as a "beginning date" because the APA, though offering some
refinements, was essentially a ratification of existing developments. The author
elsewhere has suggested that the predominant federal model of administrative law
has again changed to what might be termed the evaluative model. This latest
development relates only peripherally to the function of administrative law judges
and is not discussed here. For a brief discussion of the evaluative model as
reflected in formal analysis requirements and judicial standards of review, see
Boyd, supra note 5.
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A. Separation of Powers and the Classical Model
It is impossible to consider the history of American
administrative law without discussing the doctrine of separation of
powers. This doctrine, about which so much has been written, has a
long but confused pedigree. Its origins lie in the distant history of
English government, when powers that once lay solely in the King
were over long centuries painfully differentiated and eventually
wrested away from the monarch to create parliament and courts." It
is closely related to the concept of mixed government, which in the
English example had brought major contending powers of society
into balance, with elements of monarchy in the King, aristocracy in
the House of Lords, and democracy in the House of Commons.'
2
Separation of powers is also integrally related to the idea that
preservation of individual liberty requires limits on the exercise of
government power. 13 It is this last connection that has especially
11.
What had actually happened was that in early times all the
functions of government, whether legislative, administrative, or
judicial, had resided in an almost undifferentiated form in certain
authorities. Then, gradually, the settlement of disputes was
handed over to be decided by certain high officers called judges,
and a characteristic formal procedure for dealing with these
affairs was elaborated side by side with the evolution of certain
legal doctrines and methods of thought.
WILLIAM A. ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20 (1951).
Robson went on to note that the very word "court" reflects the origin of the
judicial function: "Curia, or court, formerly signified the king's palace or mansion,
and we still talk about the court of St. James's, or of the court having moved to
Windsor, when we intend to refer to the king's person or entourage." Id. at 41.
12. Separation of powers "easily became combined with the very different
theory of mixed government, that is, the balancing of the estates of the society into
three parts of the legislature." GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 152 (1969).
13. The history of English liberalism might be said to have begun with the
Magna Carta in 1215 and would eventually escalate into the Glorious Revolution of
1688. The liberal political and social ideas of the 17th century exemplified by the
writings of Montesquieu and Locke strongly influenced the radical Whigs in
America. See WOOD, supra note 12, at 16. "[I]n all tyrannical governments the
supreme magistry, or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested
in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these
two powers are united together, there can be no public liberty." I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 146.
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influenced American administrative law.' 4
Separation of powers inspired the founders of our nation 15
because it was perceived as the only practical mechanism to restrict
government power and so secure liberty.' 6 But if the principle of
limited government was widely accepted, there was considerable
disagreement as to how best to effectuate it in the structure of
government. In 1788, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay published a series of newspaPer essays that have come to be
known as "The Federalist Papers."' Their aim was to convince
readers that the new Constitution proposed by the convention should
be ratified.
In defense of the new Constitution's allocation of government
power, Madison famously wrote: "[T]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.", 8
In context, Madison was not just making an argument against
concentration of power; he actually was arguing - against opponents
who claimed that in the new Constitution the powers were too mixed
and not clearly identified _19 that pure separation was impossible. He
14. "Historically, the underlying premise of administrative law has been the
limitation of government power in order to preserve private autonomy." Stewart,
supra note 7, at 1811 (citing Louis C. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review
and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q. REV. 345 (1956)).
15. Not only the United States Constitution, but each of the fifty states of the
Union has a strict separation of powers clause, a general clause, or an implied
clause. For a brief discussion and classification of each of the states, see F. Scott
Boyd, Legislative Checks on Rulemaking Under Florida's New APA, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (1997).
16. "The device 'of the several powers being separated, and distributed into
different hands, for checks, one upon another,' declared the Congress, was 'the
only effectual mode ever invented by the wit of men, to promote their freedom and
prosperity."' WOOD, supra note 12, at 150.
17. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY, & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS (Gary Wills ed., 1988).
18. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Gary Wills
ed., 1988).
19. Separation of powers had been a central mechanism in the restructuring of
the state constitutions during the preceding decade, several of the states had
adopted more explicit separation clauses, and there were concerns, especially from
the "antifederalists" that the proposed constitution did not limit governmental
power sufficiently. See WOOD, supra note 12, at 150-61.
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in fact was arguing that strict isolation was a sterile concept - that the
realities of government and law would require accommodation.
Madison went on to argue that the important part of the concept
of separation was not that precise functions could ever be separately
assigned within the four corners of the Constitution, but that the
executive, the legislative, and the judicial departments would
naturally have a jealous inclination to prevent the others from
encroaching on their power. He wrote: "but the great security against
a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives
to resist encroachment of the others." 20 In other words, Madison
describes that separation can be preserved, and the protection it
provides secured, when those who wield each power are made to
counter each other.
The Federalists, of course, prevailed; the convention's work was
ratified. The government created by the Constitution of the United
States is in fact clearly separated into three parts. Article I states:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House ofRepresentatives.,,21 Article II states: "The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.' 22 Article III
states: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish., 23 Consistent with Madison's
argument, however, the precise functions which comprise each of
these three fundamental powers are only vaguely described.
The first century of the republic under the new Constitution was a
time of congressional government with essentially self-executing
laws and minimal administration. 24  In place of the complex
regulatory statutes that would later arise, the basis for regulation was
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 122 (James Madison) (Andrew Hacker ed.,
1964).
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
22. U.S. Const. art. 1I, § 1, cl. 1.
23. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
24. THEODORE Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE
UNITED STATES 94 (2d ed. 1979); Marianne Smythe, An Irreverent Look at
Regulatory Reform, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 454 (1986).
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common law tort and property principles. In general, Congress was
able to both pass the laws and directly oversee their implementation
by the Executive.26
Under this classical model of administration, legal analysis
centered on who was to exercise what substantive powers, and on the
source and limits of those powers. 27  In addition to separation of
powers, the model found expression in the doctrines of checks and
balances, void-for-vagueness, dual federalism, and standards attached
to grants of power. The central principle running through each of
these doctrines is that governmental power must be exercised only
within carefully controlled limits, kept in check by various
constitutional restrictions. The classical model asserted that an
agency may act only within the substantive boundaries set forth in its
statutory grant and that it is the courts which determine the scope of
this authority through interpretation of the statute. Narrow
interpretation of statutory delegations and the concept of substantive
limitations on administrative power are the hallmarks of the classical
model.
One of the earliest delegation cases that reached the Supreme
Court was Wayman v. Southard, decided in 1825.8 The case
25. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1192 (1986).
26. The minimalist federal government outlined in Philadelphia in 1787
envisioned a handful of cabinet departments to conduct the scanty business of
government, each headed by a Secretary responsible to the President and thinly
peopled with political employees. Significant regulatory responsibilities were not in
view; administration even of the public lands was decades in the future. Peter
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 582 (1984).
27. The term "classical model" is the author's. See Boyd, supra note 5, at 251.
Numerous commentators have identified many of the same characteristics. This
early period of federal administrative law also has been termed "constitutional
fundamentalism," Richard Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 323 (1987); "structuralist," Shapiro & Levy, supra note 7; and "transitive,"
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 369, 380 (1989).
28. 23 U.S. 1 (1825). Citation has been sometimes made to the earlier case of
The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. 382 (1813), as authorizing
a delegation of legislative power to the President, but it seems better described as
allowing Congress to make legislation contingent upon a specific event, and
authorizing the President to determine and declare that such an event has in fact
occurred.
involved the constitutional duty of the Congress to ordain and
establish inferior courts.29 The legislation accomplishing this task
had gone on to incorporate certain state procedures for returning of
writs, filing of declarations, and other similar matters for the federal
courts, and it then delegated to the federal courts the power to change
these procedures. The power of the Congress to delegate this power
to the courts was challenged, but upheld by the Court.
Three points of the case are instructive. First, the Court reiterated
the concept that the three branches of government performed distinct
functions. Second, the opinion declared that while essential
legislative power could not be validly delegated, Congress exercised
other powers that could be delegated if general guidance was
provided. 31  Third, the Court stated that determination of which
powers could be delegated was difficult, and was a question
ultimately for the judiciary.32 The Court's approach, reiterating the
basic principle while carving out exceptions or limitations, was to be
repeated.
The first case involving congressional allocation of judicial
power may have been American Insurance Co. v. Canter, decided
only a few years later.33  Congress had established courts for the
territory of Florida, not yet a state, and the question arose as to
whether these courts were among those described in Article III of the
Constitution, embracing life tenure for their judges and other
attributes. The Court concluded that they were not. The decision
29. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
30. "The difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law .. "
The opinion also stated: "It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative." Wayman, 23 U.S. at 46.
31. The opinion stated:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act
under such general provisions to fill up the details.
Wayman, 23 U.S. at 43.
32. "[T]he maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the
other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate
and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily." Id. at 46.
33.26 U.S. 511 (1828).
34. Id.
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instead found that Congress had plenary authority with respect to the
territories and could grant judicial power to entities it created there
without any violation of Article 111.35 American Insurance Co. v.
Canter thus clearly authorized delegation of judicial power, though it
did so only in a very limited circumstance.
A case more influential in the later development of administrative
law was Den, ex dem. Murray v. The Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co.,36 decided in 1855. This case involved a warrant
issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury regarding public debt revealed
through audit of a collector of the customs for the port of New York.
The process was issued without a court, as provided by the statute.
The plaintiffs claimed the statute constituted an exercise of judicial
power and so was in violation of Article III. The opinion first
pronounced that only a court or its agents could exercise the judicial
power of the United States,37 but went on to declare that there were
also some matters involving "public rights" that could either be
determined by the judiciary, should Congress so decide, or on the
other hand could be placed in the hands of the executive, putting the
government in the same position as a private person statutorily
granted extra-judicial remedies for wrongs committed against them.3 8
35.
These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general
government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right
of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and
regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States.
Id. at 546.
36. 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
37.
It must be admitted that, if the auditing of this account, and the
ascertainment of its balance, and the issuing of this process, was
an exercise of the judicial power of the United States, the
proceeding was void - for the officers who performed these acts
could exercise no part of that judicial power. They neither
constituted a court of the United States, nor were they, or either
of them, so connected with any such court as to perform even any
of the ministerial duties which arise out of judicial proceedings.
Id. at 275.
38.
Although these early cases may have created some cracks in the
separation of powers ideal, it was the passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887 that heralded the end of the congressional
century. For the first time, there was a clear delegation of executive,
legislative, and judicial powers into a single entity.39 No longer did
Congress feel capable of directly overseeing administration of the
law. This was a substantial break from tradition, but the classical
model of administrative law struggled on, perhaps in part because
there was as yet no articulated theory to replace it.4° In any event, the
Interstate Commerce Act contained fairly clear standards regarding
the jurisdiction of the commission and the type of conduct to be
regulated, and there was a substantial history of common law and
state regulatory efforts to give the terms in the statute specific
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it
proper to state that we do not consider congress can either
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its
nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial
power a matter which, from its nature, is not a subject for judicial
determination. At the same time there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are
susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may or
may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United
States, as it may deem proper.
Id. at 284.
39. Stewart, supra note 2, at 337. "The very identifying badge of the modem
administrative agency is the combination in the same hands of the judicial power to
adjudicate cases and the legislative power of rulemaking, along with the executive
powers to enforce, to investigate, to initiate, and to prosecute." 1 KENNETH DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2:4, at 71 (2d ed. 1978).
40. A.V. Dicey, the legendary British authority on constitutional law,
maintained that the fundamental principle of "rule of law" in England and the
United States precluded the very existence of "delegated adjudication." A.V.
DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 172, 177 (1885). He said that proper interpretation of the rule of
law meant that "no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or
goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary manner before
the ordinary courts of the land." Id. Dicey later acknowledged, though criticized,
the development of administrative law in England in his 8th edition, which was
published in 1914, and wrote The Development of Administrative Law in England
31 LQREv.148 (1915) the following year. Robson, supra note 11.
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meaning.4' Similar statutes followed.42
As the exercise of judicial power by executive and independent
agencies 43  became more common, courts and commentators
struggled to somehow distinguish the function being performed to
remain consistent with constitutional design. Attempts were made to
draw a distinction between questions of fact and questions of law for
purposes of delegation.44 After all, even though determinations of
41. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1677, n.28. Asimow notes: "The 1887
Commission was remarkably toothless and was rendered even more ineffectual by
hostile court decisions." Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ's in
Historical Perspective, 20 J.NAALJ 157, 158 (2000).
42. The Interstate Commerce Act was amended in 1906 to allow hearing
examiners to receive evidence. Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584, 594-95 (1906).
In 1914, legislation created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and similarly
allowed for the appointment of examiners. Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717, 718(1914). The FTC provisions were copied in at least fifteen regulatory statutes
between 1920 and 1940. Daniel Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The
Relevance of Past Choices to Future Directions, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997)
(citing LLOYD MUSOLF, FEDERAL EXAMINERS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION 52-53 (1953)).
43. In this discussion, no attempt has been made to identify or examine
constitutional issues specifically associated with "independent" agencies at the
federal level. Roosevelt's New Deal agencies, with which the APA history is so
intertwined, were almost exclusively executive branch agencies. Florida,
consistent with its stricter approach to delegation, does not recognize that
independent agencies can be created by the legislature, thus all agencies are within
one of the branches, most often the executive. See Commission on Ethics v.
Sullivan, 489 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1986). As Peter Strauss has noted, whatever
agencies' formal structures might be, "[e]ach 'legislates' in adopting the rules the
corporation is compelled to obey; each engages in executive activity in conducting
investigations, adopting policies within the 'legislative' framework, or deciding to
initiate formal proceedings; each 'adjudicates' the ensuing complaints." Strauss,
supra note 26, at 585.
44. As late as 1932, however, the Court declared in Crowell v. Benson:
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative
agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their
proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does
not require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use,
and that the Congress could completely oust the courts of all
determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them with
finality in its own instrumentalities or in the executive
department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists
under the federal Constitution, and to establish a government of a
bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental
fact relevant to a case had historically been an integral~art of judicial
proceedings, these had been the provinces of the jury. Fact finding
could therefore be delegated to an agency without any immediate
sense of loss of power by the judiciary. The agency had to make
factual determinations every day in order to carry out the laws, and
the agency's familiarity with the subject matter made it well-suited
for the task. The agency could make factual determinations; the judge
could then take those findings and apply the law on review.46 The
ability of an agency to make determinations of fact that were binding
on the courts seemed to be a small concession that did not affect
separation of powers. But though there was no apparent reduction in
the power of the judge as an individual, there was a reduction in the
relative power of the court as a government institution in relation to
the agency.
However tidy this split of jurisdiction initially may have
appeared, the inevitable difficulties of differentiating between
questions of law and fact soon arose. 4 7  The "ultimate fact" of
whether or not an individual has violated a legal standard is a mixed
question of law and fact, involving not only the legal conclusion as to
exactly what conduct constitutes a violation under the law, but also a
factual evaluation of the conduct of the individual against that
48threshold. As time went on, agency conclusions of law were given
an increasing degree of deference by the courts, including not only
technical issues such as those involved with rate making, but also
rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts,
and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.
285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932) (affirming the lower court determination that statute
would be invalid if construed to deny trial de novo of issues of fact affecting the
existence of the employer employee relation).
45. Id. (referring to the historical and constitutional functions of juries in
upholding the power of Congress to delegate the determination of factual issues).
46. Even Landis, an early staunch advocate of increased agency authority,
maintained that questions of law were ultimately for the courts:
[T]hus I return to the issue of 'law' as being the dividing line of
judicial review - as bounding the province of that 'supremacy of
law' that is still our boast. Our desire to have courts determine
questions of law is related to a belief in their possession of
expertness with regard to such questions.
James Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts, 47 YALE L. J. 519,
535 (1938) (emphasis omitted).
47. See infra note 191.
48. See generally Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985).
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more purely legal questions such as interpretation of statutory
terms.
Efforts were next made to describe a discrete realm of "quasi-
judicial" power based upon the subject matters involved.5° Such a
solution proved elusive. The courts in fact formerly handled some
subjects now addressed through administrative adjudication, such as
workers' compensation, and it could not be denied that adjudication
on other subjects vested for the first time in agencies would have
been within the power of the courts but for the legislative delegation.
We have continued to struggle with this issue to the present day. The
difference between causes of action arising in common law, equity,
or admiralty as opposed to statutory ones might yet provide one basis
49. Perhaps the most famous case prior to the APA involving judicial
deference to agency determinations of ultimate fact was National Labor Relations
Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., in which the Supreme Court deferred to the
Board's determination that newsboys were 'employees' under the National Labor
Relations Act. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). An argument can be made that some actually
intended the Federal Administrative Procedure Act to reverse the judicial trend of
extending deference to agency conclusions of law. Title 5 U.S.C., section 706
provides: "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action." (2004).
50. Perhaps the most formal attempt was contained within the Report of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers (sometimes referred to as the "Sankey Report"
after Lord Justice Sankey). His Majesty's Stationery Office (1932). Although
dealing with separation of powers in a parliamentary system without a written
constitution, the Sankey Report was widely quoted by scholars in support of all
sides of the debate on this side of the Atlantic. Compare AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
733-36 (1936) [hereinafter 1936 Report], with Robson, supra note 11, at 419-69.
In summary, the Sankey Report defined a judicial decision as presupposing an
existing dispute and evincing four characteristics: (1) presentation (not necessarily
oral) of their case by the parties; (2) to the extent that a dispute of fact was
involved, the marshalling of evidence and the framing of argument on the
evidence; (3) to the extent a question of law was involved, the submission of legal
argument by the parties; and (4) a final decision with findings upon the facts in
dispute and rulings on, and application of, the law of the land. Sankey Report at
73-74. The Sankey Report went on to conclude that a quasi-judicial decision,
while similar, did not necessarily involve the third element, and never involved the
fourth. Id. at 88-90. If the fourth element was present, the decision was properly
classified as judicial. Robson, supra note 11, at 445.
of "subject matter" distinction,5 1 but there is no consensus.
B. The New Deal Constitutional Revolution
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected in 1932, he immediately
began to work with the Democratic Congress to fight the Depression
through the creation of numerous new federal agencies that had been
given broad missions. 52  While supporters viewed the extensive
discretion to be exercised by these agencies as governed more by
principles of an objective science of public administration than by the
art of politics, 53 concerns began to grow:
So long as administrative power was kept within
relatively narrow bounds and did not intrude seriously
on vested private interests, the problem of agency
discretion could be papered over by applying plausible
labels, such as 'quasi-judicial' or 'quasi-legislative,'
designed to assimilate agency powers to those
exercised by traditional government organs. But after
the delegation by New Deal congresses of sweeping
powers to a host of new agencies under legislative
directives cast in the most general terms, the broad
and novel character of agency discretion could no
longer be concealed behind such labels.
54
While the push for Congressional action that eventually resulted
in the Administrative Procedure Act was motivated in large part by
55political opponents of the New Deal, that opposition often was
expressed in the form of arguments about balance of powers. But it
is not fair to say that all of those who voiced concern with this
51. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). But, as this divided opinion suggests, this is not a universally held view.
52. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1562.
53. Thomas Sargentich, The Reform of the American Administrative Process:
The Contemporary Debate, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 385, 399 (1984). James Landis is
perhaps most closely identified with this conception of administration. See
generally JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (Greenwood Press 1974)
(1938).
54. Stewart, supra note 7, at 1677 (footnotes omitted).
55. Shepherd, supra note 2.
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perceived threat to our government's tripartite structure were simply
opportunists embracing convenient arguments to oppose the
objectives of the New Deal. The constitutional issues raised were
legitimate ones. 56 Interest in administrative reform had resulted in the
introduction of legislation to constrain agencies before the Roosevelt
administration 57  and several key Congressional sponsors of
administrative reform bills were in fact New Deal supporters. 58
Whatever the varied political or philosophical motivations of
legislators, the voice most directly framing the constitutional
arguments to be highlighted here came from the American Bar
Association's Special Committee on Administrative Law.59
Beginning in 1933, the Special Committee and the ABA were
engaged in a battle with the Roosevelt administration over
"institutionalization." 60 That decade-long battle reflected concern
56. An interesting article describing political ideologies involved in APA
history and scholarship is Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L.
REv. 447 (1986).
57. S. 5154, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929). The sponsor of the bill was Senator
George Norris, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Norris apparently
introduced the bill in order to control the excesses of Republican-controlled
agencies, Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1567, just as conservatives' reform bills later
sought to control New Deal agencies.
58. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1578, describes Senator Mills Logan, sponsor of
1933, 1936, 1939, and 1940 bills, as a Democrat who sometimes supported
Roosevelt and the New Deal on issues other than administrative reform, and noted
that Representative Emanuel Celler, sponsor of 1936 and 1939 House bills, was
"like Logan, a New Deal Democrat." Id.
59. The Special Committee on Administrative Law was first formed in 1933. It
issued lengthy committee reports each year as part of the ABA Annual Report,
recommending legislation, and generally lobbying for administrative reform.
Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1571, fully recognizes the separation of powers element
of the Special Committee's opposition to the New Deal, "The committee argued
with special vigor that agencies violated constitutionally required separations that
were essential to the success of American government. The ABA opposed the
combination, which had occurred in many agencies, of legislative, executive, and
judicial functions: many agencies would establish rules, enforce them, and
adjudicate violations." He also identifies two other factors driving ABA
opposition: first that the New Deal agencies threatened the major clients of the
elite bar and second that the diminished importance of traditional litigation
represented a personal threat to the legal profession.
60. Institutionalists view administrative adjudication as a process to formulate
and announce public policy, while judicialists views adjudication as a process to
preserve fairness and due process for the citizen. For a brief discussion of the
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with two distinct constitutional issues: (1) the goal of decisional
independence, grounded in the due process clause and (2) the goal of
institutional check, grounded in balance of powers.
6 1
The ABA was very concerned with the treatment of adjudication
as if it were simply another executive policymaking technique.
62
Although the Supreme Court by this time often sanctioned quasi-
judicial actions, it had never suggested that such adjudication was
somehow an inherently executive function. Rather, it acknowledged
that, within limits, adjudicative power could be delegated to the
executive or independent agencies by legislative act.63  This
distinction was critical to the ABA's conception of the balance of
powers problem and therefore to the solutions that the Special
Committee proposed.64
There were changes and developments in the position of the
Special Committee over the years. At first, the creation of an
administrative court that would conduct the adjudicatory hearings
65being performed by agencies was recommended. In 1936, it
struggle between these points of view in the context of the New Deal, see Michael
Asimow, supra note 41, at 160-6 1.
61. "No such reactionary position is taken in insisting, nevertheless, on
safeguarding individual interests and preserving the checks and balances involved
in the common law doctrine of the supremacy of law and the constitutional
separation or distribution of powers which is fundamental in our American polity."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 342 (1938) [hereinafter 1938 REPORT].
62. "When, acting under a power conferred by statute ... [an administrative
official] holds a hearing and makes a determination ... he is in fact performing a
judicial function, which will be referred to as 'quasi-judicial' ... [T]hose functions
which are generally acknowledged to belong to the executive arm . . . are not
comprised within the terms 'quasi legislative' and 'quasi-judicial.' AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 410
(1933) [hereinafter 1933 Report].
63. See supra text accompanying notes 26 through 35.
64. From the outset, the Special Committee recognized the difficulty of any
strict separation of power, "the boundary lines between executive, legislative, and
judicial functions are not rigidly or unalterably fixed, any more than is the
interpretation of any other part of the Constitution." 1933 Report, supra note 62, at
409 n.4.
65. The Special Committee reports for 1933 and 1934 discussed different
options, but recommended the creation of the special administrative court. In later
years the recommendation was only to combine existing administrative courts into
a single body, not divest other agencies of their adjudicatory functions, as the
earlier proposals would have done. Shepherd suggests that this change was a
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advocated creation of an administrative appellate tribunal, then, in
1937, this recommendation was given up,66 and appeal of
administrative decisions to the circuit courts of appeals was
67advanced. For our purposes, however, the reports were quite
consistent in the nature of the constitutional concerns and their
recognition of the importance of independent fact-finding.
From the first, constitutional concerns were phrased in terms of
Madisonian balance of powers, not strict separation. 68 The 1936
report described in some detail balance of powers concerns with
vesting legislative and judicial power in the hands of an agency also
exercising executive power. Notwithstanding that several recent
court cases had struck down New Deal programs vesting legislative
or judicial powers in agencies, 69 the Special Committee expressed no
illusory hope that judicial decisions would ultimately return
adjudication to the courts and legislation to the Congress. Instead,
the report noted that the realistic objective should not be to end
delegation to agencies, but rather to prevent the commingling of the
legislative, judicial, and executive powers in a single agency.o
tactical move reflecting Roosevelt's overwhelming popularity. See Shepherd, supra
note 2, at 1574-75.
66. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1582. The report recommended that aggrieved
persons could request a hearing from a three-member interagency board. The
board's decision could be appealed to the court of appeals.
67. 1936 Report, supra note 50, at 767.
68. The ABA was not alone in its criticism. The President's own study, the
"Brownlow Report" famously characterized administrative agencies as a "headless
fourth branch" of government, and noted that they carried on "judicial functions
which threaten the impartial performance of that judicial work." REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 68 (1937).
69. Cited in the 1936 Report, supra note 50, at 725, 727, 774-77, are: Panama
Ref Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 355 (1938) (overturning portions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act on grounds of delegation of legislative power); R.R. Ret.
Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1936) (overturning portions of Railroad
Retirement Act as exceeding Commerce Clause and violating due process);
Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1936) (overturning portions of
the National Industrial Recovery Act on grounds of delegation of legislative
power); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding the Agricultural
Adjustment Act unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power to tax and
invading state prerogative); and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(holding the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act unconstitutional on grounds of
delegation of legislative power).
70.
The treatment of findings of fact was often mentioned in the
reports. After an historical review which included battles between the
English common law courts and the King, the 1936 report concluded,
"Thus, the decision of issues of fact, originally removed as far as
possible from the Executive, has been thrown bodily into the lap of
the administrative agency exercising executive powers, and the court-
house doors are closed to trial of them by independent judges." 71
Significantly, independent fact-finding was seen as important for two
reasons: first to ensure fairness and ensure due process; second to act
72as a check on concentration of power.
By 1940, with Roosevelt's political power somewhat waning,
73
Congress was able to muster enough votes to pass the Walter-Logan
Bill 74 containing many of the 1937 report's recommendations. It
allowed aggrieved persons a hearing before a board, with written
record and findings, and appeal to the court of appeals. 75 The bill also
addressed rulemaking. It required notice and public hearings, not
simply comment, on all pro posed rules and allowed preemptive rule
challenges in federal court.
It should be kept in mind that from the point of view of
administrative law (in the sense in which the committee uses the
term) the interesting feature of this subject is not that legislative
powers are delegated but that they are delegated to agencies
having at the same time executive and frequently also judicial
power. In many discussions of the separation-of-powers
doctrine, there has been altogether too much stress on the word
"delegate," and too little on the "basic and vital" object of the
doctrine which, as stated earlier in the report, is 'to preclude a
commingling of these essentially different powers of government
in the same hands.'
1936 REPORT, supra note 50, at 767 (citing O'Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)).
71. 1936 Report at 730.
72. 1938 REPORT, supra note 61, at 355.
73. Roosevelt's court-packing plan, unveiled after the 1936 election, proved
unpopular and was ultimately rejected. The opposition it engendered undermined
public support for the New Deal to some degree and created an opposition
legislative coalition. William Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did
They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L. J. 2077,
2111 (1999); Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1581.
74. H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1940).
75. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 847-48 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 Report].
76. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1583.
Florida ALJs: Maintaining a Different BalanceFall 2004
194 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
The Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the Walter-Logan
Bill expressed balance of power concerns in no uncertain terms:
The basic purpose of this administrative law bill is to
stem and, if possible, to reverse, the drift into
parliamentarism which, if it should succeed in any
substantial degree in this country, could but result in
totalitarianism with complete destruction of the
division of governmental power between the Federal
and the State Governments and with the entire
subordination of both the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal Government to the executive
branch wherein are included the administrative
agencies and tribunals of that Government. 77
One month after Walter-Logan was introduced in the Senate,
President Roosevelt directed his Attorney General to form a
committee to study administrative reform that quickly set to work to
help prevent the passage of the bill.78 Although not succeeding in
that objective -- Walter-Logan passed both houses, and was then
vetoed by the President 79 -- the committee report became an
important part of the continuing debate.
The 1941 Report of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure contained quite a bit of discussion on the
problem of separation of functions. The majority advocated internal
separation of prosecuting and adjudicatory functions, while the
minority would have insisted on segregation into different bodies.
All agreed that a co-mingling of these powers was undesirable,
however.
77. Id. at 1601. The House Judiciary Committee made a similarly strong
statement:
It can never be admitted in this country that the administrative
bureaucrats shall control the legislative and judicial branches of
this Government. This may be considered as a warning to those
who are more intent on securing and exercising greater autocratic
powers in the administration of the laws than the Congress has
conferred upon them.
Id. at 1604.
78. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1598.
79. 86 CONG. REC. 13, 942-43 (1940).
On the related issue of agency authority over the ALJ's
recommended order, the 1941 Report noted:
In general, the relationship upon appeal between the
hearing commissioner and the agency ought to a
considerable extent be that of trial court to appellate
court. Conclusions, interpretations, law, and policy
should, of course, be open to full review. On the other
hand, on matters which the hearing commissioner,
having heard the evidence and seen the witnesses, is
best qualified to decide, the agency should be
reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly
shown.8
0
Though this sentence might suggest "clear error" was being
touted as an agency standard of review, in context, other passages
reveal this language to constitute only policy recommendation to
agencies, or perhaps a concession to the minority. At page 53 the
report stated:
Agency heads should have the authority, when
reviewing hearing commissioners' determinations, to
affirm, reverse, modify (including the power to make
the finding which they deem required by the record),
or remand for further hearing. It should be open for
them to adopt, wholly or partially, the findings,
conclusions, decision, or order from which appeal has
been taken.
Taken as a whole, the report language cannot be interpreted as
advocating any legal restriction on the authority of the agency to
make changes to findings of fact.
The bill recommended by the Final Report provided that in the
absence of timely appeal by the affected party or directed review by
the agency head, the order of the AU would become the final
decision. 8 Although the recommended bill allowed the agency full
80. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 51 (1941).
81. Id. at 200.
Fall 2004 Florida ALJs: Maintaining a Different Balance
196 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
discretion to affirm, reverse, modify, or set aside the hearing
commissioner's decision, it also contained an interesting provision in
Section 309:
Where the appellant asserts that the hearing
commissioner's findings of fact are against the weight
of the evidence, the agency may limit its consideration
of this ground of appeal to the inquiry whether the
portions of the record cited disclose that the findings
are clearly against the weight of the evidence.82
Although at first glance this provision might seem to be a
restriction on agency power, upon closer consideration it is clear that
it was not for two reasons. First, the option to limit the agency's
consideration lay completely within the discretion of the agency
itself. Second, limited consideration could only be applied on an
appeal, not on directed review by the agency. Thus, it presumably
would have provided deference only to recommendations adverse to
the appellant, not to recommendations adverse to the agency. Even
when applicable, this provision afforded only minimal deference to
the findings of the hearing commissioner because they could be
overturned despite the existence of competent, substantial evidence
supporting the findings. 8
3
C. Decisional Independence and the Procedural Model
While few provisions of the 1946 APA were ultimately derived
84from the Attorney General's Report, both it and the Benjamin
Report on agencies in the State of New York which was issued the
following year, 85 emphasized the need for agencies to retain control
82. Id. at 201.
83. Allowing reversal if findings are against the weight of the evidence is
almost, but not exactly, equivalent to de-novo evaluation by the agency. See the
discussion at note 241 and accompanying text on the confusing comparative
stringency of standards of review in connection with some state APA provisions.
84. Ken Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform
Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 520 (1986). The Report was, however,
incorporated into the legislative history.
85. Milton Carrow, Administrative Adjudication: Should its Role be Changed?,
27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 281 (1959).
over adjudicatory power, and proposed that concerns about fairness
and due process could be addressed by a separation of functions
within an agency.
86
In the meantime, World War II had taken center stage and
pressures to enact a generally applicable reform statute lessened. At
war's end, calls for reform returned, but the animosity of the
opposing factions was dissipated.87 Collaboration between executive
and congressional players began in earnest. 88 Private negotiations
put together a bill that could be passed and signed into law. "The
painstaking work of the Committees on the Judiciary of each house,
as incorporated in their reports, and the cooperation of the attorney
general did much to account for the unanimity of legislative opinion
on what had for years been a controversial issue."89 As is usually the
case with legislation, no one was completely satisfied, but all thought
it was the best that could realistically be achieved. 90 President
Truman signed the Administrative Procedure Act into law.
The Act confirmed the new procedural model of administrative
law91 that had been evolving. Under the procedural model, legal
analysis centers on the way in which administrative decisions are
reached. The model promotes application of expertise and procedural
safeguards in decision-making, rather than external substantive
limitations.9 2 The procedural model finds expression in concepts of
adequate notice, impartiality, fair hearing, due process, and standards
established by the agency exercising the authority.
There are two premises underlying these concepts. The first is
86. Id.
87. Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72
VA. L. REV. 219, 230 (1986).
88. Shepherd identifies several factors explaining the new spirit of
compromise. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1675.
89. Id. at 1675 (quoting Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Legislative Background of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
1, 12 (George Warren ed., 1947)).
90. Id.
91. The model is usually called "procedural," and there is general agreement
on its characteristics. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 7, at 2; Shapiro & Levy, supra
note 7, at 397. The procedural model has also been termed "traditional." Stewart,
supra note 7, at 1671.
92. The author has discussed the procedural model's characteristics in
conjunction with a comparison of federal and Florida law in Boyd, supra note 5, at
251-54.
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that the questions confronting government are susceptible to
scientific rationality, that is, there are "correct" answers. The second
premise is that the way administrative decisions are reached can
determine the accuracy of those decisions. These premises of the
procedural model had their basis in "legal process" scholarship,93
which compared the relative institutional competence of legislatures,
courts, and agencies. In general, the model concludes that courts are
well equipped to review the procedures which agencies follow, but
do not possess the necessary expertise to review the substance of
administrative decisions.
Deeply woven within the controversy in the years preceding
adoption of the APA were serious questions regarding fidelity to the
balance of powers ideal, largely sacrificed to the countervailing
pragmatic demands for agency expertise and efficiency. In the end,
the perspectives advocated by the ABA had only minimal influence.
As Shepherd summed it up, "Brilliantly reasonable minds readily
differed, with conviction, on whether New Deal programs'
impositions on individual rights and twisting of constitutional
separations were acceptable or worthwhile. The APA was a cease-
fire armistice agreement that ended the New Deal war on terms that
favored New Deal proponents." 94
The Act did contain several provisions designed to bolster AU
independence. It placed their appointment, removal, compensation,
and tenure in the hands of the Civil Service Commission, and
allowed removal only for cause. 95  It prohibited ex-parte
communications on a fact in issue, except after notice and provision
of opportunity for all parties to participate.96 It did not allow an AU
to be responsible to, or subject to the supervision of, an employee
performing investigatory or prosecutorial functions. 97  It expressly
stated that no employee engaged in investigative or prosecutorial
functions could participate in the decision or recommended decision
93. Perhaps the best exposition of legal process approach is contained in
HENRY HART & ALBERT SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Harvard University Press 1958).
94. Shepherd, supra note 2, at 1560-61.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2004).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2004).
97. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2004). The statute goes on to exempt the agency
head from this restriction.
in that case or related cases.98 Finally, the Act provided that ALJs
were to perform no duties inconsistent with their adjudicatory
responsibilities and should "be assigned to cases in rotation so far as
practicable."
99
The Federal APA thus created an internal separation of the
adjudicatory function from other parts of the agency to insure
independence of action by the administrative law judge, but was
unwilling to assign ALJs outside of the agency in a central pool. The
decision to keep ALJs within the various agencies was at least partly
motivated by the emphasis placed upon agency expertise. ALJs were
to provide independence but at the same time preserve the superior
appreciation of the subject matter, interest group politics, and social
and economic consequences of the issues to be decided that inhere in
the agency. Similarly, one of the most telling provisions of the
Federal APA relating to Administrative Law Judges is the provision
regarding agency review of their orders. 100 The Act provided that the
AU would issue a preliminary decision that would become final
unless reviewed by the agency. On review of the recommended
decision, the Act provided that the agency would "have all of the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision."''
Agency heads were free to substitute their judgment for that of the
AU on questions of fact, law, and discretion.
Thus, as part of the federal transition from the classical model of
administrative law to the procedural model, separation of powers was
transformed into separation of functions. But though superficially
similar, these two principles are fundamentally distinct. Under the
classical model, just as the power of the federal government had been
balanced against the power of the states and of the people, and the
power of the Senate had been balanced against the power of the
House of Representatives, so, too, the power of the legislature had
been balanced against the power of the executive and the power of
the judiciary. As noted earlier, ° 2 separation of powers was based
upon the notion that each department would have the incentive and
ambition to defend its allocation of power from encroachment by the
other departments. The objective was to thwart the concentration of
98. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2004).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2004).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 557 (b) (2004).
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
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power in any of the departments and so preserve individual liberty.
Separation of functions, however, is based upon the totally
distinct concept that following proper procedures in the
administration of policy can ensure justice. Just as a fair hearing
requires adequate notice and an opportunity to present evidence and
argument, it requires an independent and unbiased adjudicator.
Separation of functions is premised upon the notion that any actual or
apparent bias must be eliminated and that this can only be assured by
divorcing investigatory and prosecutorial functions from
adjudication. The objective is to ensure fairness and achieve
individual justice. Separation of functions also has constitutional
inspiration, but it is due process, not separation of powers.
The design of the Act attempted to enhance adjudicatory
independence of the individual AL from agency prosecutorial
function, but provided no external institutional check on agency
exercise of adjudicatory power. Despite the ABA's concerns, the
separation of functions provisions ultimately provided no restriction
on the role of the agency as both executor of the law and adjudicator
of disputes. The goals of efficiency and unitary process in
implementation of policy had trumped balance of power concerns
that counseled against placing executive and judicial power in the
same institutional hands.
At the federal level, the classical model's attempts to define
judicial power and confine its exercise to the courts were over. 103
While debates continue, most administrative scholars can agree only
that "judicial" power is that which is vested in the courts and "quasi-
judicial" power is that which is exercised by administrative
agencies. °4 For purposes of separation of powers analysis, such a
103. The Sankey Report and similar taxonomies were criticized for
incorporating procedural elements as defining characteristics. Under such a
definition a legislature might properly delegate to an agency the power to affect
important rights and duties of the individual if it proceeded without testimony or
hearing, but could not do so if the agency were required to provide the safeguards
customarily used to protect private rights. Such a constitutional regime would be
self-contradictory. See Ray Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial
Power, 19 MINN. L. REV. 261, 269-70 (1935).
104.
Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative,
quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in
order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers
scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying
distinction is but a tautology, grounded in the reality that if judicial
power were taken from agencies and every dispute had to be
submitted to the courts, they would be overwhelmed, and the cost
would be prohibitive.
Although there have been a few amendments, the APA as enacted
in 1946 has remained remarkably unchanged. 10 5 It is worth noting,
however, that the federal courts have somewhat adjusted the
significance of AL's orders on subsequent judicial appeal. In
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,106 the
Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's refusal to consider
contrary findings of the hearing examiner when determining whether
,quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized
classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover
which we draw over our confusion as we might use a
counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.
FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
105. This statement, as well as the broader thesis that the federal system is
essentially a pure implementation of the procedural model, is of course an
oversimplification. The development of hard look review is mentioned at note 117
and related text, and the idea of an evaluative model is mentioned at notes 10 and
223. More intriguingly, a couple of more recent changes might even be stirrings of
a return to classical elements at the federal level. First was the passage of the
Congressional Review Act. This 1996 APA amendment requires agencies to
submit all rules to Congress for its review and allows for joint resolutions of
disapproval. It has only been successfully used once, but the very adoption of the
mechanism may reflect congressional concerns with the scope and exercise of
agency power. A second development, perhaps more significant for the federal
system given its judicial source, is the case of United States v. Mead Corp., 553
U.S. 218 (2001), in which the Court restricted the degree of deference accorded
agency's statutory interpretations by declining to afford Chevron deference to a
letter ruling of the Customs Service, declaring the less formal and less strong
deference of Skidmore applicable instead. The result of the ruling seems to reverse
Chevron's key innovation - that is, the universal default presumption that statutory
silence or ambiguity indicates an implicit congressional delegation to the
administering agency - in a large category of cases. After Mead, it can be argued
that there must be evidence of some actual congressional intent to delegate
interpretative authority, either legislative rulemaking authority or formal
adjudicatory authority, or some other indicia of legislative intent. This is hardly an
adoption of Florida's strict position, but it does seem to indicate a retrenchment
from Chevron, which might become the high water mark of agency deference. For
some thoughts suggesting the return of concerns about concentration of political
power at the federal level, see also Peter Strauss, From Expertise To Politics: The
Transformation Of American Rulemaking. 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745 (1996).
106. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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an agency final order was supported by competent, substantial
evidence. Justice Frankfurter crafted a looser interpretation,
mandating consideration of the entire record, including the
examiner's findings, when determining the substantiality of
evidence. 1
07
The Court's review of the legislative history of the Act concluded
that Congress had "expressed a mood" requiring that courts assume
more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of
decisions.l°8 The Court noted that the APA required consideration of
the whole record, and the 'substantiality' of the evidence must
therefore take into account whatever in the record fairly detracted
from its weight. 109 The findings of the ALJ are, of course, a part of
that record, and so Universal Camera directed that boards, and
ultimately courts, give these findings the weight they reasonably
command. 11° The Court thus enhanced the effect of an ALJ'sfindings of fact in the federal system.
III. FLORIDA HISTORY
"If we are to continue a government of limited powers, these
agencies of regulation must themselves be regulated." Elihu Root
The historical development of the procedural model of
administrative law at the federal level traced above unquestionably
had a profound influence on Florida administrative law, but Florida's
strong embrace of elements of the classical model distinguishes it
from the federal system.
A. Phantom Government
Several factors compelled Florida to consider a wholesale
revision of its Administrative Procedure Act by the early 1970's.
First, there were federal case law developments. The landmark
decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,'' determined that certain procedures
107. Id. at 474.
108. Id. at 487.
109. Id.
110. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 497 (1951).
111. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
were constitutionally required in the revocation of government
benefits. 112  Goldberg neither reversed the long string of earlier
decisions that had allowed administrative agencies to conduct their
own hearings, 13 nor required that full-fledged judicial proceedings
be transplanted into the executive branch," 4 but it did serve as
introduction to an ongoing series of cases which have sketched,
erased, and redrafted the parameters governing agency conduct of
contested hearings. Goldberg was another step toward the
"judicialization" of administrative procedures and it forced Florida to
re-evaluate its adjudicatory structures.1 1 5
At the same time, other cases at the federal level were beginning
to highlight the critical role of the judiciary in the procedural model
of administrative law. In an effort to increase oversight, the district
courts had interreted the APA's statement of basis and purpose in a
broad fashion" and in Citizens of Overton Park v. Volpe, the Court
had endorsed a "hard look" review, requiring the judiciary to make a
more substantial inquiry into an agency's processes and decision. 117
At the same time, the Court reaffirmed that due process did not
mandate any procedural checks on "legislative" decisions.'' These
developments called attention to the need for stricter review of
agency actions, but offered a solution that seemed to diminish
legislative control and oversight.
A second impetus for the revision of Florida's APA in the early
1970's was that some of the premises of the procedural model of
112. Goldberg ruled that welfare was a legal entitlement, meaning recipients
could not constitutionally be deprived of their benefit without pretermination
hearings invoking substantially all of the protections of a formal trial. Id. at 262.
113. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
114. Paul Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1992).
115. The broad and somewhat awkward historical effects of Goldberg on state
administrative procedure were surveyed in Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
116. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass'n. v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
117. Citizens of Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (finding that
Section 706 of the APA requires a reviewing court to engage in a thorough,
probing review).
118. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1973) (finding
that proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards not
impacted by due process clause) (citing Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915)).
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administration were being re-examined. Scholarship was beginning
to question the value of the "scientific expertise" argument for
vesting adjudicatory power in agencies. Agency decision-making
began to be seen more as a political process of reconciling competing
claims of various interest groups affected by agency policy. 119
Agencies regulating various industries were accused of "capture" by
the very interests they were supposed to be regulating.2 As the
agency's role increasingly came to be viewed as more political than
scientific, 12 concerns with concentration of power returned.
Finally, and probably most significantly, the Legislature was
again concerned with the extent of executive agency power. During
the 1950s and 1960s, a massive expansion of agency power had taken
place, in terms of both the range of activity and the number and scope
of administrative proceedings. 122 In addition, whereas agency action
in the past had focused primarily on institutions such as common
carriers and public utilities, it had increasingly begun to directly
involve members of the public. 123 Small reforms had been initiated,
but agencies had resisted. At first, they were even reluctant to publish
their rules 124 and legislation with mandatory publication requirements
similar to those found in the Model Act were passed in 1955.125 A
few years later, Florida's first full-fledged APA was enacted,
including minimal adjudication procedures, based substantially upon
the Revised Model State Act. This 1961 Act required basic
separation of functions within the executive branch, "No hearing
119. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 23 (1976).
120. Thomas McGarity, Regulatory reform and the Positive State. An
Historical Overview, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 399, 408 (1986).
121. A good summary of the ideas and scholarship that subsequently arose
challenging the New Deal's justification for extremely broad agency discretion is
found in Stewart, supra note 7, at 1676-88.
122. Cornelius Kennedy, A National Perspective of Administrative Law and
the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 65, 65 (1975).
123. Id.
124. Initial efforts in June of 1953 to seek voluntary cooperation of state
agencies in the publication and promulgation of their rules were abandoned in favor
of actions to make publication mandatory. Report of the Committee on
Administrative Law, 28 FLA. B. J. 146 (1954).
125. 1955 Fla. Laws ch. 29-777. See Richard Lee, Second Survey of Florida
Law, 10 U. MIAMI L. REv. 129, 130 (1956).
126. Mark Evans, Procedural Due Process. Florida's Uniform Administrative
Procedure Act, 21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 145 n.5 (1966).
examiner shall, in any proceeding where he has presided as hearing
examiner or a factually related proceeding, participate or advise the
agency in entering its order except through his recommended
order. ' 27 One early case under this Act described the status of the
examiner under this act as a "functionary" of the administrative
agency. 28
The 1961 Act cured few problems, however, and the concerns
with agency power continued. Coverage of the Act was in doubt, and
agencies fought against inclusion. 129  Even though the procedures
mandated by the Act were minimal, the Law Revision Council
Reporter noted that its provisions were "widely ignored."' 130 Under
the Act, agencies were able to issue oral orders, which were
inherently subject to retroactive change and were essentially not
reviewable by the judicial branch. 131 Agencies also reportedly would
delay or withhold adjudicatory decisions in certain embarrassing or
controversial cases.'
Pressures increased in the early 1970s, and the Florida
Legislature was receiving numerous complaints about agency actions
from citizens and interest groups. 133 Specific examples of executive
agency abuses compiled by a Legislative Committee included
unlawful tax assessments, adoption of rules without statutory
authority, and expansion of permitting requirements in direct
127. FLA. STAT. § 120.28 (1965) (repealed by 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-310 4).
128. Nicholas v. Wainright, 152 So. 2d 458, 461 (Fla. 1963).
129. Memorandum from Representative Curtis Kiser, Memorandum on Trip to
Sacramento, California to Review the California Administrative Procedure Act 1,
(December 1973) (on file at the Florida Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee, Tallahassee) [hereinafter California Memorandum].
130. Analysis of New Administrative Procedure Act CS/SB 892, Page 1, June
25, 1974, Arthur England, Series 83, Carton 11, Florida State Archives,
Department of State. [hereinafter Analysis of New APA]. See also Philip Lewis,
The Role of the Joint Legislative Administrative Procedures Committee, 3 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 82, 82 (1975) (making the same observation with respect to the 1961
APA).
13 1. Analysis of New APA, supra note 130, at 2.
132. Id.
133. Memorandum from Committee on Rules and Calendar, Memorandum
Outlining Problems with Administrative Governance I (on file at the Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee) [hereinafter Undated Memorandum].
Although undated, references to specific incidents in the body of the report indicate
it was prepared for consideration in conjunction with legislation during the 1974
session.
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contravention of expressed legislative intent. 134 From the legislative
perspective, such complaints evidenced not routine failures of
administration, but a fundamental systemic problem.' 35 A committee
report described such agency actions as a threat to constitutional
government and legislative power, "Related to these practical
problems of concern to the average citizen, is a bedrock issue of
constitutional government: To the extent that administrative agencies
ignore or flout the standards laid down by the legislature in the law,
they breach the constitution."' 136
Complaints that agencies were adopting rules and regulations
contrary to expressed legislative intent were particularly disturbing to
the Legislature.137 The Senate President began a publicity campaign
to call attention to the problem by requesting an Attorney General's
Opinion. 138 Use of the term "phantom government," as an epithet to
describe the perception of "out of control" executive agencies
became common, 1 39 and public support for the Legislature to more
closely review executive branch exercise of delegated legislative and
judicial power grew. 140
134. Id.
135. Some letters also shared this perspective: "If something is not done soon
to put the government of Florida back into the hands of the people through our
elected representatives, we predict problems not unequal to the present Federal
situation of executive over-control." Letter from Tri-County Engineering
Company to Senator Thomas Johnson (November 27, 1973) (on file at the Joint
Administrative Procedures Committee).
136. Undated Memorandum, supra note 133, at 1.
137. California Memorandum, supra note 129, at 2. See also Lewis, supra
note 130, at 85 (mentioning some abuses of rulemaking by state agencies).
138. Fla. Atty. Gen. Op. 73-489 (Dec. 26, 1973).
139. "Senate President Mallory Home won a round in his fight against what he
calls a 'phantom government' Friday as Attorney General Robert Shevin said state
agencies cannot adopt rules without specific legislative authority." United Press
International, Shevin Says Laws Limit Agency Rulemaking, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Dec. 29, 1973. See also John Van Gieson, Bill Tightening State Rules
Clears, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Apr. 19, 1974, (stating that "Senate President-
designate Dempsey Barron, D-Panama City, is a particularly vocal critic of what he
refers to as a 'phantom government' which makes decisions that go beyond
legislative intent." The term has remained in Florida politics). Raymond Mariotti,
Senator Lewis Shadowing Phantoms, PALM BEACH POST-TIMES, Nov. 24, 1974;
Mary Ann Lindley, 1974 and the Opera of the Phantom, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, June 29, 2003.
140. California Memorandum, supra note 129, at 1.
B. Professors, Practitioners, and Politicians
In early February of 1973, a subcommittee of the House
Committee on Governmental Operations conducted hearings and
staff studies of the Administrative Procedure Act. 14 1 A modest bill
primarily revising the definitions of "agency" and "rule" in order to
clarify and expand coverage of the Act was subsequently passed by
the House and Senate, while further revisions to the Act were delayed
to allow more detailed staff work to be completed during the interim
period between legislative sessions. 142  This preliminary bill was
vetoed by the Governor.
143
Meanwhile, in preparation for the 1974 legislative session, the
Florida Law Revision Council had adopted as its principal interim
project a complete re-write of the Administrative Procedure Act. 144
The Council contracted with Arthur England to prepare a draft for
consideration. 45 England in turn sought assistance from the Center
for Administrative Justice, an organization that had been created in
1972 by the American Bar Association. 1
46
An ad hoc group 147 was put together by the Center for
Administrative Justice to work with England. The group met in
141. Brief History of Administrative Procedure Reform 1973-74, Committee
on Government Operations, Florida House of Representatives, July 3, 1974, at 2.
from Series 19, Carton 284, Florida State Archives, Department of State
[hereinafter Brief History].
142. H.R. 2145 (Fla. 1973).
143. Brief History, supra note 141, at 2.
144. ARTHUR ENGLAND, Reporters Comments on Proposed Administrative
Procedure Act for the State of Florida, at 2 (1974), reprinted in ARTHUR J.
ENGLAND, JR. AND L. HAROLD LEVINSON, Florida Administrative Practice Manual
(Supp. 1999).
145. Id.
146. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 66. For a brief article on the purposes and
projects of the Center for Administrative Justice by its director, see Milton M.
Carrow, Administrative Justice Comes of Age, 60 A.B.A. 1396 (1974).
147. The task force was headed by Milton Carrow, Director of the Center for
Administrative Justice and former ABA Section of Administrative Law chair.
Other members included: Frederick Davis, Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri; Carroll Gilliam, Esq., Washington, D.C.; Cornelius Kennedy, Esq.,
Washington, D.C.; Joseph Griffin, Esq., Washington, D.C.; Harold Levinson,
Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School; Hans Linde, Professor of Law at the
University of Oregon, and Robert Park, Professor of Law at George Washington
University.
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September 1973 and prepared a draft containing several key
provisions: mandating full availability of all agency decisions,
enhancing public participation, minimizing distinctions between
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial actions, compartmentalizing
judicial review, and creating a central panel of administrative law
judges. 148 A committee of the Law Revision Council then teamed up
with the House subcommittee and continued hearings and staff work.
On November 30, 1973, a second draft of a new APA bill was
released, followed by more hearings.
In December of 1973, a task force 149 from the Florida Law
Revision Council went to California to study its central panel system.
Meetings were held with the Office of Administrative Hearings,
several departments of state government, the Attorney General, and
private members of the administrative bar.' 50 While everyone with
whom the task force talked was generally supportive of the California
system, 151 a few deficiencies were identified. One concern was that
findings of fact of the administrative law judge need not be accepted
by the agency. 152
In its report, the task force concluded that the centralized hearing
officer system had worked with remarkable success since its
inception in California, efficiently serving a large number of agencies
while strongly enforcing the impression of impartiality. 153 The report
submitted to the Law Revision Council recommended all of the
major features of the California central panel, as well as some
improvements designed to further refine the concept. 154 After
148. Letter from Art England, Reporter to the Florida Law Revision Council
(Oct. 26, 1973) (on file at the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee).
149. The group included Senator Tom Johnson, Representative Curt Kiser, Pat
Dore, FSU Professor of Law, William Falck, Executive Assistant to the Chief
Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, Barry Lessinger, Attorney with the
Department of Administration, and McFerrin Smith, Executive Director of the Law
Revision Council. Preliminary Report to the Florida Law Revision Council: Task
Force Trip to California to Review the California Hearing Examiner System (Mar.
9, 1974) (on file with the Florida Joint Administrative Procedures Committee).
150. Id. at2.
151. Id. at 13-14.
152. The California Office of Administrative Hearings recommended that
some form of the competent substantial evidence rule be applied during agency
review of an administrative law judges recommended order. Id. at 12-13.
153. Id. at 14-15.
154. Id. at 15.
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additional cycles of public hearings before the Council and the
subcommittee, followed by revisions, on March 9, 1974 the Council
adopted a final, fifth draft. This draft included the California task
force's recommendation for agencies to apply a competent
substantial evidence review of findings of fact in recommended
orders, and it became a starting point for House and Senate bills.'55
The pressures for administrative reform spawned several similar
bills in the House, but each had distinctive elements: House Bill 2672
contained a central panel, but allowed the agency full authority to
reject or modify findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommendations; 56 House Bill 2583 created a joint legislative
committee to oversee rulemaking and agency actions pursuant to the
Act;' 57 House Bill 2434 contained the task force recommendations
regarding agency review of recommended orders."' On April 15,
1974, these three bills were combined into a Committee Substitute by
the House Governmental Operations Committee. After thirty-four
floor amendments, CS/HBs 2672, 2434, and 2583 unanimously
passed the House on April 17, and were sent to the Senate, where
they were referred to the Rules and Calendar Committee. 1
59
Meanwhile, on the Senate side, Senate Bill 490 had been
introduced. It contained most of the provisions in the combined
House Committee Substitute, and, in addition, provided that the
Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings was to make an
annual written report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives outlining violations of the Act by
agency heads, employees, or representatives.' A Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 892 was focused substantially on control of
executive branch rulemaking, and contained several provisions
strongly reflective of the classical model of administrative law. It not
only created a legislative oversight committee to review rules, but
also granted central panel hearing officers the authority to declare
proposed and existing rules invalid. 16  Senate Bill 490 died in the
Rules and Calendar Committee, while CS/SB 892 unanimously
155. England, Reporters Comments, supra note 144, at 1.
156. H.R. 2672 (Fla. 1974).
157. H.R. 2583 (Fla. 1974).
158. H.R. 2434 (Fla. 1974).
159. Journal of the House of Representatives, at 352, April 17, 1974.
160. Summary of SB 490, Senate Bill Drafting, April 3, 1974.
161. Journal of the Senate, at 399, May 14, 1974.
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passed the Senate with 12 amendments on May 14, 1974.162
When the House received CS/SB 892, they struck everything
from the bill and replaced it with the language in the combined bill
they had passed earlier.' 63 The Senate refused to concur in these
amendments when it returned there, and a conference committee was
appointed on May 27. The Conference Committee Report essentially
merged CS/HBs 2672, 2434, and 2583 with CS/SB 892.164 This
compromise was unanimously passed by both houses and signed into
law by the Governor on June 25, 1974.165
C. Back to the Future
The Florida APA as finally enacted provided for expanded and
clarified coverage,166 basic procedures to ensure due process, 167 and
adequate public notice and record of agency actions.' 68  It also
contained several innovative elements such as the draw out provision,
participatory rule hearings, a legislative oversight committee, and
compartmentalized judicial review' 69 that reflected a renewed
commitment to the classical model of administrative law. 170  But
perhaps the greatest innovation of the new Act was the creation of the
Division of Administrative Hearings and the roles assigned to the
162. Id. at 40 1.
163. Journal of the Senate, at 550, May 27, 1974.
164. Senate Bill Actions Report, at 206, July 17, 1974.
165. Brief History, supra note 141, at page 2.
166. See infra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.
167. The new Act attempted to provide, "[t]he right to present viewpoints and
to challenge the view of others, the right to develop a record which is capable of
court review, the right to locate precedent and have it applied, and the right to
know the factual bases and policy reasons for agency action." England, Reporters
Comments, supra note 144, at 5.
168. The Act required meetings and workshops to be noticed in advance with
copies of the agenda made available, the rulemaking process to be better
publicized, adopted rules to be published in a code, and agency orders to be made
available with a subject matter index. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 65 (citing FLA.
STAT. ch. 74.310 (1974)).
169. The draw out provision, participatory rule hearings, compartmentalized
judicial review are discussed in Stephen Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and
Judicial Review in Florida, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 767 (1991). Florida's legislative
oversight committee, administrative rule challenges, and judicial review are
specifically discussed as reflective of the classical model in Boyd, supra note 5.
170. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
division's ALs.
The role of the new AUs was an important one. First, the
Florida act had been designed to apply to virtually all state
agencies 171 and to be "self-effectuating." This is to say that unlike the
Federal act, which applies only if an extraneous statute requires a
hearing, Florida's APA applied through its own power whenever a
person's substantial interests were affected. 172 Then, if there was a
disputed issue of material fact involved, the act went on to require
use of an AU.
173
Second, while the due process concerns of Goldberg undoubtedly
motivated the Florida drafters, 174 it is clear that use of the term
"substantial interests' 175 was intended to expand the use of ALJs
beyond those instances constitutionally requiring a hearing
process. 176 As the reporter noted, the act now covered "the
discretionary determinations of many governmental agencies and
officers, which have been characterized as "quasi-judicial," quasi-
legislative" or "quasi-executive," or have otherwise been exempted
from the operation of administrative procedure laws."' 177 The Act
171. In comparison, Asimow has estimated that only 5 percent of agency
adjudications in California are covered by its Act, Michael Asimow. Toward a
New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39
UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1073 (1992).
172. The Act provided: "The provisions of this section shall apply in all
proceedings in which the substantial interests of a party are determined by an
agency." Fla. Laws ch. 310 § 1 (1974). Compare the federal approach, "This
section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of adjudication
required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing .... 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
173. The act allows an agency head to itself conduct the hearings, but this
provision is almost never used. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.569(1) (2003).
174. Goldberg & Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), was specifically
discussed at page 18 of England, Reporters Comments, supra note 144.
175. For example, substantial interest hearings were conceived to sometimes
apply in rule adoptions. This attempt to end the strict dichotomy between
rulemaking and adjudication was one of the most unusual aspects of the new Act.
"A more flexible approach based upon whether there are policy issues or disputed
issues of material fact to be determined will result in better decisions than
procedures based upon the notions of rulemaking and adjudication." Kennedy,
supra note 122, at 69. For a discussion of the general failure of this innovative
concept attributed to restrictive judicial interpretation, see generally Maher, supra
note 169.
176. England, Reporter's Comments, supra note 144, at 17.
177. Id. at 18.
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thus inserted ALJs into cases that previously would not have been
constitutionally or statutorily subject to either administrative hearing
or judicial review under writ of certiorari. 178
In addition to the expanded use of ALJs in the most important
and controversial cases, Florida chose to create its ALJs as part of a
central panel. 179 The Division of Administrative Hearings, though
not denominated as a department, was established as functionally
independent within the executive branch.' 80  Its director was
appointed by the Administration Commission and confirmed by the
Senate.' 81 It should be remembered that although central panels are
now common, they were quite rare in 1974. The concept had been
discussed, but seldom acted upon. At the Federal level, an
administrative court had not been created, 182 but the general idea of
housing ALJs outside of the agency had persisted. It had been the
substance of a recommendation of the second Hoover Commission a
decade later, 183 but never became law. Separate administrative
178. See Dickinson v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal, 282 So. 2d 168
(Fla. 1973); Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1969). England, Reporter's Comments, supra note 144, at page 18,
expressly stated that the new Act was intended to overrule the law of these cases.
179. Harold Levinson noted that "a central panel is likely to be accompanied
by greater independence." L. Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A
Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 236, 245 (1981).
180. The language "The Department of Administration shall provide
administrative support and service to the division. The division shall not be subject
to control, supervision, or direction by the Department of Administration" was
added by Section 46, Chapter 79-190, Laws of Florida. The statute now reads:
The Department of Management Services shall provide
administrative support and service to the division to the extent
requested by the director. The division shall not be subject to
control, supervision, or direction by the Department of
Management Services in any manner, including, but not limited
to, personnel, purchasing, transactions involving real or personal
property, and budgetary matters.
FLA. STAT. ch. 120.65(1) (2003).
181. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.65(1) (Supp. 1974).
182. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
183.
Where the proceeding before the administrative agency is strictly
judicial in nature, and the remedy afforded by the agency is one
characteristically granted by the courts, there can be no effective
bodies had occasionally been created to review decisions of certain
other Federal agencies. 184 Among the states, California had been the
first to adopt a central panel in 1945,185 and twenty years later,
Missouri had followed suit in a limited fashion,186 but no other states
had taken this step at the time Florida was considering its
legislation. 87
Several advantages of the central panel have been suggested,
188
perhaps the most prominent of which has been that it fosters the
perception of fairness. 189 While due process and essential fairness
can arguably be achieved without a central panel by careful attention
to the separation of investigatory and prosecutorial functions, on the
protection of private rights unless there is a complete separation
of the prosecuting functions from the functions of decision.
U.S. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 84 (1955) [hereinafter 1955 Report to Congress].
184. A separate administrative review body has not been widely used in the
federal system, but has occasionally been employed. On October 27, 1972, about
two years prior to Florida's new APA, section 15(a) of Pub. L. No. 92-576
amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to provide
for a distinct administrative tribunal to review ALJ decisions under the competent
substantial evidence standard (see subsection (b)(3) of 33 U.S.C. 921). There are
also some often cited examples of "split-enforcement," with rulemaking conducted
by one agency and adjudication by another, such as the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Administration (FMSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 659, 661 (1994); 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1994)
The old-age, survivors, disability and health insurance programs administered by
the Social Security Administration (SSA) provide for adjudication by an
administrative law judge with discretionary review by an Appeals Council.
185. Asimow, supra note 171, at 1071.
186. Missouri's 1965 Administrative Commission operated only with respect
to certain licensing entities. See Special Project - Fair Treatment for the Licensed
Professional: The Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. REv.
410 (1972).
187. Hardwicke reports that Massachusetts and Tennessee also adopted central
panels in 1974, but they could not have provided models for Florida's
consideration. John Hardwicke, The Central Panel Movement: A Work in
Progress, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 441 (2001).
188. See, e.g., Gerald Ruth, Unification of the Administrative Adjudicatory
Process: An Emerging Framework to increase "Judicialization" in Pennsylvania,
5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 297 (1996). A specific assessment of some advantages of
Florida's central panel is provided by William Sherill, The Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings, 75 FLA. B. J. 22 (2001).
189. Asimow, supra note 41, at 164.
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one hand, from adjudicatory ones, on the other, it is less clear that the
appearance of impartiality can be similarly achieved. 190 In any event,
procedural fairness was clearly one of Florida's objectives in creating
its central panel, "It is ludicrous to think that an agency that sits as
prosecutor, judge, and jury is not tainted with some prejudice that has
to spill over into its decision-making at the various stages."' 191
But Florida's creation of a central panel should also be
considered in light of its commitment to the classical model of
administrative law. Administrative law judges were granted
authority not only to conduct hearings on agency rules, but to issue
final orders in such cases.192 After conducting a formal hearing upon
petition of a substantially affected person, ALJs were authorized to
determine if a proposed or existing agency rule constituted "an
190. As Bernard Segal noted:
Consider, for example, the unavoidable appearance of bias when
an administrative law judge, attached to an agency, is presiding
in litigation by that agency against a private party. One can fill
the pages of the United States Code with legislation intended to
guarantee the independence of the administrative law judge; but
so long as that judge has offices in the same building as the
agency staff, so long as the seal of the agency adorns the bench
on which that judge sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the
case is by the very agency whose actions or contentions thatjudge is being called on to review, it is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for that judge to convey the image of being an
impartial fact finder.
Bernard Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and the
Road Ahead, 62 A.B.A. 1424, 1426 (1976).
191. California Memorandum, supra note 129, at 10.
192. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.56(2) (2003) (proposed rules); FLA. STAT. ch.
120.56(3) (2003) (existing rules). In 1991, Florida's APA was further amended to
grant final order authority to ALJs in challenges to policy not adopted in rules, Sec.
3, Chapter 91-30, Laws of Florida, now codified at ch. 120.56(4) F.S. Provisions
outside of the APA also provide for ALJ final orders in selected proceedings:
Section 57.111(4)(d) F.S. (award of costs and attorney fees to prevailing small
business party); Section 287.133(3)(e)2.e (order placing state vendor on convicted
vendor list); Section 287.134(3)(d)2.e (order placing state vendor on discriminatory
vendor list); Section 394.467(7)(a) F.S. (order regarding continued involuntary
placement of mentally ill patients); Section 945.45(4) F.S. (order regarding
continued placement of inmates in mental health treatment facilities); Section
1003.57(5) F.S. (order regarding identification, evaluation, and placement of
exceptional students).
invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority." 93 Both
the particular language of this standard to determine invalidity and
the placement of the proceedings in a forum beyond control of the
agency strongly illustrates intent to provide a check on agency
power. 194 When considered in conjunction with other provisions of
the Act which require agency policy formulation by rule, 195 the broad
plan to have the division defend legislative control by ensuring
consistency with statutory authority becomes even clearer.
Perhaps the most revolutionary provision of Florida's new Act,
however, constrained agencies in their treatment of recommended
orders. ALJ findings of fact in substantial interest hearings could not
easily be changed. As finally enacted, Florida's APA provided:
The agency may adopt the recommended order as the
agency's final order. The agency in its final order may
reject or modify the conclusions of law and
interpretation of administrative rules in the
193. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.54(3) (Supp. 1974). Originally this authority was
viewed as limited to a determination that a rule was beyond the authority granted to
the agency under its enabling act. See Patricia Dore, Rulemaking Innovations
Under the New Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 97, 98 (1975).
The phrase was later statutorily defined more broadly to codify other bases of
invalidity that had been described by the courts, such as procedural deficiencies.
Fla. Laws ch. 87-365. The 1974 Act also authorized ALJs to determine if a rule
was an "exercise of invalidly delegated authority." This was soon declared
unconstitutional because it involved the power to rule a statute invalid, which
power could not be delegated to the executive branch. Dept. of Admin. v. Div. of
Admin. Hearings, 326 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The
Legislature later repealed this language in Chapter 76-131, Laws of Florida.
194. The statutory standards for decision have become more restrictive over
the years. Under 1996 and 1999 amendments, agencies are required to have
specific statutory authority to adopt a rule. Fla. Laws chs. 96-159, § 3, 99-379 § 2.
For a critical view of such strict rule review standards in Florida and other states,
see Jim Rossi, "Statutory Nondelegation": Learning from Florida's Recent
Experience in Administrative Procedure Reform, 8 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 301 (1999).
195. As noted in an early case, Florida's act was premised on the requirement
that agencies adopt policy by rule. McDonald v. Dep't of Banking & Fin., 346 So.
2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (noting general requirement but creating an
"incipient policy" exception). Subsequent amendments have more explicitly
reiterated this requirement. ALJs issue final orders in separate proceedings to
compel adoption of agency policy by FLA. STAT. ch. 120.56(4), and their
determinations as to un-adopted policy in recommended orders cannot be easily
overturned by an agency. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.57(l)(e).
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recommended order, but may not reject or modify the
findings of fact unless the agency first determines
from a review of the complete record, and states with
particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were
not based upon competent substantial evidence or that
the proceedings on which the findings were based did
not comply with essential requirements of law. 196
This innovative language placed the agency in the posture of a
court in reviewing the findings of fact' 9 7 contained in a recommended
order of the AU. While similar proposals had occasionally been
advanced, Florida may have been the first to enact such a provision
into law. The provision appears to have been crafted as a
recommendation of the Law Revision Council group that went to
California. 198 This unique approach in bifurcating agency review of
recommended orders was designed to promote the application of
agency policy expertise by easily allowing modification of
conclusions of law, while simultaneously providing a check on the
exercise of agency adjudicatory power by making modification of
factual findings difficult.' 99
196. 1974 Fla. Laws 74-310 § I (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ch.
120.57(10)(2003).
197. Mention should be made of the recognized difficulty in distinguishing
findings of fact from conclusions of law. A finding of fact is a declaration that
something happened or that a condition exists. Theoretically, such a finding is
made prior to, and independent of, any consideration of the legal or policy
consequences of that finding. In practice, facts and policy are often difficult to
separate, as evidenced by the many cases describing "mixed questions of law and
fact" or "ultimate facts." Although not addressed by Florida's APA, some court
decisions have attempted to generally treat some findings of fact as conclusions of
law for purposes of review. See McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583.
198. While a similar review standard had been suggested when the Federal
APA was being considered thirty years before, federal agencies were ultimately
given full authority to modify findings of fact. The Second Hoover Commission
also made a similar recommendation in 1955. With respect to adjudicatory matters,
"The decision should only be set aside [by the agency] if clearly erroneous in view
of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record . . . ." 1955
Report to Congress, supra note 183, at Recommendation 49.
199. While the legislative history leaves no doubt that "balance of power" was
the primary concern of the Legislature, other benefits can be suggested. Lack of
agency control over findings of fact emphasizes the importance of the hearing itself
by forcing the agency to marshal its evidence and argument for the benefit of an
24-2
d.
It might be added that the Florida Legislature has continued to
confirm and enhance the significance of an ALJ's recommended
order. In 1996, restrictions upon agency treatment of certain AU
conclusions of law and interpretation of rules were added to the
Act,2°° and when a court construed these provisions quite
narrowly, 201 the legislature immediately reiterated and clarified its
202broader intent. An agency may now only reject conclusions of law
"over which it has substantive jurisdiction." 20 3  These provisions
have proven awkward in operation.
204
impartial third party. The competent substantial evidence standard ensures that
deficits in evidence at the hearing cannot be ignored by the agency during an
agency review process, ensuring that contested cases are truly determined "on the
record."
200. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 159 § 19. The amendments allowed an agency to
modify only those conclusions of law over which it had substantive jurisdiction.
This amendment recognized that in any contested case, legal issues will inevitably
arise that are neither governed by the agency's enabling act nor especially within
an agency's substantive expertise. For example, disputes may arise as to
procedural or evidentiary issues common to all hearings, the resolution of which
may implicate the fairness and consistency of adjudicatory proceedings under the
APA. Additionally, in rare cases in which administrative adjudications must reach
constitutional issues, there may or may not be applicable agency expertise. The
statutory scheme's recognition that agency expertise may not extend on the one
hand to the mundane identification of hearsay or on the other to the lofty
protections of the First Amendment - but rather occupies some middle ground
coextensive with the agency's policy portfolio - is surely theoretically correct. This
in no way ensures that the particular mechanism of the Florida Statute premised on
this conceptual reality will work as intended, however, see infra note 202.
201. Dep't of Children & Families v. Morman, 715 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (Ervin, J., concurring) (statutory change had simply clarified existing
law and did not affect an agency's authority to modify an AL's conclusion of law).
202. 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 379 § 6 (codified at FLA. STAT. ch. 120.57(l)(1)
(2003). In addition to clarifying its earlier intent that an agency could not modify
an AL's conclusions of law over which the agency had no substantive jurisdiction,
the Legislature added a further requirement that an agency must state with
particularity its reasons for modifying conclusions of law and make a finding that
the agency's substituted conclusion is at least as reasonable as that which was
modified. While more a "paperwork exercise" than a substantive restriction, the
mood of the Legislature seems clear.
203. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.57(l)(1) (2003).
204. Creation of a single order, some portion of which is to be final as
authored by the AU and other portions of which are only to be final as issued by
the agency, creates difficulties. In Barfield v. Dep't of Health, 805 So. 2d 1008
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), the AU ruled that grading sheets relied upon by the
Board of Dentistry to deny a license application were hearsay. The Board in its
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Taken as a whole, the broad scope of ALJ authority, the creation
of a central panel, final order authority in rule challenge cases, and
bifurcated review of recommended orders established Florida ALJs
as a significant counterweight to agency power.20 5 As one national
commentator noted regarding the power and structure of Florida's
AIJs, "Indeed, this step brings to administrative proceedings the
separation of executive and judicial functions which is a traditional
part of our concept of government." 20 6
It was Florida's conviction that with the delegation of
adjudicatory authority to agencies performing executive functions,
one of the original purposes of an independent judiciary had been
lost. The virtue of adjudication by a separate "nonpolitical" branch of
government as a check on the concentration of executive power was
forfeited. Under Florida's APA, the creation of a central panel with
final order rejected this conclusion of law. On appeal, the court found that the
Board lacked the substantive jurisdiction to reject such an evidentiary conclusion
and so reversed the Board's order on that ground. The court went on, however, to
agree with the Board that the grading sheets met a hearsay exception. The court
then stated that the Legislature could not have intended to make ALJ conclusions
of law outside the substantive jurisdiction of the agency unreviewable, and so
proceeded to rule that the license application should be denied. As to the unusual
procedure, the court suggested that an agency harmed by recommended
conclusions which it is powerless to reject has the option either of entering a final
order under protest, and thereafter appealing from its own order as a party
adversely affected, or of seeking immediate judicial review from the AL's
recommended order. Similar cases have arisen in other districts. See, e.g., G.E.L.
Corp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 875 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(interpretation of APA attorneys' fees provision outside agency substantive
jurisdiction; agency should initiate interlocutory appeal); Deep Lagoon Boat Club,
Ltd. v. Sheridan, 784 So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (decision not to apply
collateral estoppel was outside agency's substantive jurisdiction; Department,
although an appellee, argued that the Department Secretary's reading of his
authority was too limited). Presumably the ultimate legislative objective in
highlighting areas beyond agency substantive expertise is to dissuade the courts
from undue agency deference with regard to such issues. If so, it might be more
effective to specifically clarify provisions on judicial review, or to allow "reversal"
by the agency only pursuant to an extremely restrictive standard. If part of the
concern is the practical difficulty and expense of appeal for the party injured by the
agency's reversal of an ALJ's conclusions, perhaps strong attorneys' fees
provisions would be in order.
205. William R. Dorsey, Florida's Continuing Experiment with the Central
Panel Process: The Division of Administrative Hearings, 15 J.NAALJ 77, 77
(1995).
206. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 69.
protected findings of fact in its recommended orders and limited final
order authority reinstated this institutional check. Admittedly, the
check came from within the executive branch, not from the judiciary,
but it similarly provided a balance to the concentration of power in
the agency head.
207
Florida's dissatisfaction with the procedural model of
administrative law was in no way unique. In fact, as noted earlier, it
was contemporary federal practitioners and professors who provided
the nucleus for many of Florida's innovations, which were, in that
sense, a product of the times. "In enacting this comprehensive reform
in the administrative procedures of state agencies, the Florida
Legislature has drawn upon the legal thinking and experience of the
1970's, rather than the 1940's when the last major administrative
,,208procedure acts were conceived. However, Florida's creation of
the Division of Administrative Hearings and its administrative law
judges was also unavoidably a reflection of its own history of agency
abuse of power and its own separation of power ideals.
IV. DESIGN, DYNAMICS AND DISCRETION
"[Florm ever follows function, and this is the law. Where function
does not change form does not change." Louis Sullivan
Federal and Florida histories go far to explain the different roles
that ALJs play in each system. A more complete understanding of
these differing roles, however, requires at least a quick look at the
overall design of the two statutes, viewing the ALJ provisions in a
larger context. As we have seen, the predominant philosophy
inspiring the Federal APA is the procedural model, while in contrast
Florida draws substantially from the classical model. These differing
207. This division of the executive power is not unusual in Florida
government. "Floridians have a deep distrust of executive power, which they
control by fragmenting it. The unusually broad authority assigned to the Division
of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Legislature is but another reflection of
this culture of distrust of executive authority, and the desire to rein it in." Dorsey,
supra, note 205, at 77.
208. Kennedy, supra note 122, at 65. Mr. Kennedy was the Chairman of the
Rulemaking and Public Information Committee of the Administrative Conference
of the United States. This article suggests that Florida not only drew upon the legal
thinking and experience of the 1970s, but also upon the legal thinking and
experience of the 1770s.
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philosophies are reflected in the basic design of the two Acts, which
in turn support a different system dynamic.
A. Concept and Detail
At the time of enactment of the Federal APA, adjudication was
the primary avenue for agency policy formulation.209 Agencies were
primarily engaged in regulating major industries, and important
policy questions arose under specific fact situations involving a
particular respondent. Specific agency guidance could then be
tailored to the adjudication at hand, leaving broader questions for
development over time as those issues arose. The broad
congressional delegations of power to agencies - providing little
guidance to agencies and few substantive restrictions - reinforced the
primacy of adjudication and maximized agency discretion. Nothing
in the Federal APA altered this basic structure.
The design of the Federal APA is lean. It has only a relatively
limited number of rather short provisions. The basic Act consists of
only about nine sections, including one section for definitions,21 ° one
for rulemaking, 211 and three for adjudication. 212  Even judicial
review, in some ways the heart of the legislation, is essentially
213covered in four sections. But if the provisions are short, they are
not especially simple. The Federal APA sets up many different
procedures. Requirements for formal proceedings are linked to the
214requirements of enabling acts outside of the APA, and there are
numerous broad exceptions created by the Act. 215 It must be noted,
209. The APA's emphasis upon rulemaking is often identified as the major
innovation of the APA. See Davis & Gellhorn, supra, note 84.
210. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2004).
211.5 U.S.C. § 553 (2004).
212. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-57 (2004).
213. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-04, 706 (2004).
214. "When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); "This section applies, according to the
provisions thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be
determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing ...... 5 U.S.C. §
554(a).
215. Consider just the rulemaking exceptions: Section 553(a)(1) excludes rules
dealing with military or foreign affairs functions; (a)(2) excludes rules relating to
agency management or personnel, and rules relating to public property, loans,
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too, that there have been remarkably few amendments to the Federal
216APA. The basic lack of detail in the Act provides a great deal of
flexibility for agencies and courts. The many exemptions, mentioned
but not defined, and the lack of amendments leave much for
interpretation.
In the years after enactment of the Federal APA, as agency
regulation of a few large industries and institutions gradually gave
way to mass interaction with individuals in benefits and permitting
contexts, the agency flexibility fostered by loose and infrequent
adjudication came under criticism. Adjudication became less
valuable as precedent because each factual difference could be
litigated. Pressures for more comprehensive policy, described in
advance, mounted. In Florida, with its non-delegation tradition, this
translated first, into preferences for agency rulemaking as opposed to
policy making by adjudication, and second, into demands that these
rules be carefully circumscribed within substantive limits established
by the enabling legislation.
In terms of its design, the Florida Act is considerably longer than
the Federal APA. It sets forth, sometimes in excruciating detail, the
precise information that notices must contain, 217 the standards for
award of attorneys' fees, 218 and the way the Florida Administrative
Weekly will be published.219 At the same time, the Florida
procedures are in many ways simpler. For example, there is only one
form of rulemaking, so there can be no controversy or cases about
which procedure ought to be followed. And the provisions are much
more comprehensive. While the basic definition of rule parallels the
definition in the Federal act, there are no exceptions for interpretive
grants, benefits or contracts; (b)(A) excludes rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice as well as interpretive rules and policy statements from
notice and comment but not from publication or petition provisions; (b)(B) creates
a "good cause" exception that allow an agency to dispense with some or all
requirements.
216. In 1966 the Act was recodified as part of Title 5, with a few minor
changes. In 1976, exparte communications were prohibited in formal proceedings.
In 1978, the sovereign immunity defense was eliminated in certain cases. In 1996,
the Congressional Review Act incorporated a congressional rule review mechanism
into the APA. See Steven Croley, The Administrative Procedure Act and
Regulatory Reform: A Reconciliation, 10 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 35, 37-38 (1996).
217. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.525 (2003).
218. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.595 (2003).
219. FLA. STAT. ch. 120.55 (2003).
Fall 2004
222 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-2
rules, none for policies relating to public property, none for loans,
grants, benefits or contracts. Policy statement is just another name for
rule. There is no "good cause" exception. The Florida Act, not
surprisingly, has been amended every year since it was first adopted.
B. Courts and the Legislature
Even this quick overview of the design of the Federal and Florida
Acts suggests an important difference in the dynamic of the two
administrative law systems. Primary oversight in the federal design
comes from the judiciary; in the Florida design it comes from the
legislature.
Steven Croley has noted that after having passed an
"administrative constitution," Congress has permitted the other
branches to develop Federal administrative law within the broad
parameters set by the APA.2" The APA's lean provisions offer broad
avenues for agency and judicial interpretation. Of course, every
statute must be applied to unforeseen circumstances and refined
through adjudication, but the especially broad and un-amended
provisions of the APA compel a strong emphasis on interpretation.
The remarkable result, as Kenneth Davis acknowledged forty years
after its enactment, is that it can be said that federal administ'ative
law has not been significantly shaped by the APA, "Well, I'm a little
surprised at my own conclusion, that the APA has not been especially
significant legally. I think that administrative law is predominantly a
combination of common law and constitutional law. The portions of
it that are statutory are quite limited., 221
This is not to say that federal administrative law has been
stagnant. While the APA itself has seldom been amended, there have
been several other acts that complement the APA, usually creating
additional analyses to be conducted. Thus, the National
Environmental Policy Act requires the preparation of an
Environmental Impact Statement, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
requires economic analysis of the impact on small entities, and there
is the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform
220. Croley, supra note 216, at 35.
221. Davis & Gellhorn, supra note 84, at 526.
Act, and countless more. 222 But note that these additional acts do not
change basic APA processes or enhance the role of Congress in
agency policy formulation, but rather, in keeping with the procedural
model, provide the judiciary with tools designed to ensure that
agency decision-making is a thorough process, that certain values
have been considered, that various constituencies are remembered.223
But the primary source of evolution in the Federal APA has
224
clearly been judicial interpretation. The list of judicial
"interpretations" and "gloss" on the APA would provide a virtually
complete history of federal administrative law. It has been the
courts, sometimes working with only a thread of statutory language,
that have directed federal administrative law. "The effect of the APA
may be as low as [ten] per-cent., 225
In stark contrast, the Florida Legislature - starting with its
concern with "phantom government" during the development of its
Act, and continuing essentially unabated through the ensuing years -
has jealously guarded the delegation of power to the Executive
branch. The years have seen pages of testimony given, numerous
staff studies completed, the creation of several blue ribbon advisory
groups, and even the creation of special ad hoc committees all
wrapped in the rhetoric of "restoring the balance" to government by
returning policy making to its "rightful" place in the hands of the
Legislature. 226 The provisions of the APA directed to this end or
colored with that perspective are almost too numerous to count.
227
While some Florida courts have tried from time to time to follow
222. A remarkably long list of applicable statutes and requirements for Federal
rulemaking has been catalogued by Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for
FederalAdministrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 533 (2000).
223. The author has in fact argued that these "evaluative" tools of procedure
have become so widespread, that in conjunction with "hard look" they deserve to
be considered as a new administrative law model in their own right. See Boyd,
supra note 5.
224. Croley, supra note 216, at 41-43.
225. "I would say there's a lot more that ought to be called common law than
is generally recognized. But this is law made by courts without interpreting a
statute or the Constitution. Maybe the bulk of today's administrative law is
common law in that sense." Davis & Gellhorn, supra note 84, at 526.
226. Some of this history is documented in Dan R. Stengle & James P. Rhea,
Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Legislative Struggle to Contain
Rulemaking by Executive Agencies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415 (1993).
227. For a review of some recent provisions, see Boyd, supra note 15.
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the lead of the federal courts and assume the primary role in guiding
Florida's administrative law system, usually by citing to federal case
law, they have been less than successful. In these instances, the
legislature has usually been quick to react and frequently modifies
and effectively overturns court decisions at odds with the classical
flavor of Florida's APA.228
C. Agency Deference and Agency Check
Our comparative look at the structure and dynamics of the federal
and Florida systems predicts that these two systems will have very
different approaches to agency discretion. For if the federal system
emphasizes the role of the judiciary and the Florida system
emphasizes the role of the legislative branch, still the ultimate
concern of administrative law is with neither of these, but with the
agency.
At the federal level:
[t]he APA was passed in concern over administrative
impartiality in certain agency decision making.
Congress sought to achieve two fundamental goals: to
eliminate agency control over the classification,
discipline and conflict with hearing examiners, which
is what AL~s were formerly called, and to separate the
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions, which
previousl , had resided in the same person in some
agencies.
Given such objectives, it was only natural that the APA would be
designed to place the courts, experts at fair procedure and guardians
of due process, in charge of agency oversight. The inevitable
corollary was that the courts were ill-equipped to substantively police
agency action, especially in the absence of focused legislative
guidelines. The statutory scheme thus moved the system still further
228. See, e.g., Senate Staff Analysis of S. 206 (1999) (containing specific
citation to four cases interpreting the APA on different issues that were being
clarified or "overturned").
229. Arthur Fried & Ronald Bernowski, Panel Discussion on Independence
and the Federal ALJ, 18 J. NAALJ 47 (1998) (remarks by Mr. Fried).
away from the concerns with substantive control on the exercise of
power that had previously infused the classical model. The result has
been an administrative system strongly emphasizing deference to the
agency's substantive policy role.
Florida's continued embrace of the tenets of the classical model
did not allow it to so completely abdicate substantive control over
agency policy. The Florida legislature was being pressured to rein in
executive agency excesses at home even as experts in the Federal
APA were advocating reforms there. At the same time, however, the
need for agency adjudication and policy expertise was clearly
recognized. Florida's compromise would ultimately seek to 1)
channel agency policy authority into rulemaking while granting ALJs
final order authority to ensure fidelity with delegated legislative
authority and 2) bifurcate agency review of AU recommended
orders in other cases to preserve agency expertise over conclusions of
law while giving much more limited authority over findings of fact.
These were true innovations in 1975, and together they provided a
significant check on the concentration of power in the agency head.
The legislature has continued over the years with this approach, and
has further restricted agency discretion in several areas.
The retention of substantial policy control in the body of the
legislature is not only a reflection of its APA, it is a reflection of its
Constitution. While taken slightly out of context, two quotes well
illustrate the differing philosophies of the federal and Florida
approaches to agency discretion. In the absence of legislative
guidelines governing agency discretion, the federal courts conclude
that the APA lets the agency proceed as it determines best:
[R]eview is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that
a court would have no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. In
such a case, the statute ("law") can be taken to have
'committed' the decisionmaking to the agency's
judgment absolutely. 231
In contrast, the Florida courts find in such a situation not only a
230. For a discussion of enhanced legislative oversight and restrictions, see
Boyd, supra note 15.
231. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)
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violation of the APA, but a violation of the Florida Constitution:
When legislation is so lacking in guidelines that
neither the agency nor the courts can determine
whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the
legislature in its conduct, then, in fact, the agency
becomes the lawgiver rather than the administrator of
the law.
232
V. CONCLUSION
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory..."
Louis D. Brandeis
The vesting in administrative bodies of legislative power to be
exercised through the adoption of rules and of judicial power to be
exercised through the conduct of hearings had historically been
declared by the courts not to violate separation of powers. But
despite the federal example -- and in part because of it -- Florida was
not convinced that the procedural model alone could provide
sufficient oversight of agency exercise of this delegated authority.
The federal system, essentially directed by judicial action and
animated by the demands of due process, had required notice,
procedures, and separation of functions, but ultimately had granted
strong deference to agencies and fueled the growth of administrative
power.
While Florida recognized the legitimate need to incorporate
agency expertise into the adjudicatory process, the federal solution
was increasingly seen as destructive of the balance of power among
the institutions of government. In 1974, drawing on the familiar
precepts of the classical model, Florida crafted an APA which
returned more substantive policy control to the Legislature and
attempted to strengthen the role of the courts in substantive review of
agency action. Most significantly, a central panel of ALJs was
created, with power to issue final orders in rule challenges and to
compel findings of fact in other contested cases.
Bifurcating agency review authority over recommended orders
232. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 (Fla. 1978).
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both enhanced adjudicatory independence -- fostering both due
process and balance of power ideals -- and preserved significant
agency control over policy implementation. In a formalist sense, the
Florida structure is of course no more consistent with strict separation
of powers than systems without restricted agency review of
recommended orders -- or for that matter, systems without central
panels, or even without ALJs. After all, the adjudicative process in
each of these instances is vested outside the judicial branch. 3 But in
a more "Madisonian" sense, 234 the Florida structure provides a
realistic check on concentration of power in the agency head which
statutes granting an agency unrestricted power to change the
recommended order are incapable of providing.
Some commentators have suggested the differences between the
federal and state APAs may be increasing over time. 235 If so, it
seems likely that this is because other states have also found federal
solutions inadequate to their needs. 236  The history of the central
panel, for example, has been well documented. 237 Though it has been
noted that the jurisdiction, structure, process, and authority of the
judges in these panels vary greatly,23 8 still the increasing number of
central panels among the states constitutes a slow but steady trend.
233. The limitation set forth in Den, ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855) (declaring legislative delegation of
common law, equitable, or admiralty powers to be unconstitutional), discussed
supra notes 35-37, has continued vitality. Consistent with this approach, note
Minnesota's recent holding that delegation of equitable power was unconstitutional
in violation of separation of powers, even though exercised by an ALI in a central
panel in Holmberg v. Holmberg. 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999).
234. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
235. See Arthur Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72
VA. L. REV. 297, 334 (1986).
236. Jim Rossi has identified only seven states of the fifty which today follow
the "procedural safeguards" approach advocated by Professor Davis in the 1970s.
Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167 (1999). Rossi
has suggested that institutional imperfections explain state variance from federal
administrative law. Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551 (2001).
237. Allen Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, 21
J.NAALJ 235 (2001); see also James Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State
Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALI
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (2002);
Hardwicke, suprq note 187.
238. Hoberg, supra note 237; Hardwicke, supra note 187, at 420.
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Specific attention to the concept of restricted agency review authority
over Aid decisions has been scant, 239 but in addition to Florida,
commentators 24° have identified restrictions in the states of Colorado,
Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and
Texas. 24 1  While few of these states have copied Florida's
239. Flanagan, supra note 237, at 1357 (noting a few states, including Florida,
that have restricted agency authority with respect to treatment of ALJ
recommended orders and describes this approach as part of an "emerging trend");
see also William Fauver, An Agenda for Investigation: Should the APA be
Amended to Provide Standards for Agency Review of Administrative Trials? 1973
DUKE L.J. 135 (1973) for a discussion of the issue at the federal level.
240. See Flanagan, supra note 237, at 1358; Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism,
supra note 236, at 569; Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can an Agency
Change the Findings or Conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 BAYLOR
L. REV. 65, 66 (1998).
241. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-105(15)(b) (2004) (stating that findings of
evidentiary fact, as distinguished from ultimate conclusions of fact, made by an
AU shall not be set aside by the agency on review of the initial decision unless
such findings of evidentiary fact are contrary to the weight of the evidence); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 17A.15.3 (West 2004) (agency may reverse or modify any finding of
fact if a preponderance of the evidence will support the determination); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 2-4-621 (2003) (agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact
unless the agency reviews the complete record and states with particularity that the
findings were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the
proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential
requirements of law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-36(a)-(b3) (2003) (agency shall
adopt each finding of fact contained in the AL's decision unless the finding is
clearly contrary to the preponderance of the admissible evidence, giving due regard
to the opportunity of the AU to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and if ALI
order is not adopted and agency order is appealed, the court conducts a de novo
review of the record ); 2003 Or. Laws 75 (agency conducting a contested case
hearing may modify a finding of historical fact made in the AL's recommended
order only if it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record,
and a reviewing court conducts de novo review if changes are made); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-23-610(D) (Law Co-op. 2003) (judicial standards of review are
applicable to agency review of an ALJ order, and subsection (e) allows reversal or
remand when the AU order is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative
and substantial evidence on the whole record); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
2001.058(e) (Vernon 2004) (stating that agency may change a finding of fact if the
administrative law judge did not properly apply or interpret applicable policies or
may change a technical error in a finding of fact). It is interesting to consider the
effect of statutory language employing variations of the "preponderance" standard
of proof as an appellate standard of review. Professor Flanagan states at 1371:
"The effect of this standard is to restrict substantially the agency's power to amend
facts found by the AU." Flanagan, supra note 237. But simply requiring an
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"competent substantial evidence" standard, the precise wording of a
standard of review may not be critically important as a measure of
the amount of deference given.242 As has been noted, "on balance,
the number of cases in which the choice of words would determine
the judicial outcome are probably not worth the battles that have been
fought over the proper standard to be applied." 243  The general
concept of restricting the power of the agency head with respect to
recommended orders, on the other hand, remains significant.
24
The United States Supreme Court, and to a greater or lesser
extent the state courts, 5 have long endorsed legislative delegation of
agency to support contrary findings by a preponderance standard, as the Iowa
language appears to do, effectively makes applicable the standard of proof that
would apply if the agency was hearing the case initially, in the absence of any ALJ
recommended order. This would not in itself seem to constitute any restriction,
though if a reviewing court subsequently departed from the traditional substantial
evidence standard, it could have that effect indirectly. Some of the above states
complicate matters by allowing rejection of a fact not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence, because this need not always equate to adoption of
a contrary fact, but still any restriction on agency authority seems minimal.
Admittedly, application of standards of review is hardly a precise science, and as
illustrated by Universal Camera, 340 U.S. 474, the overall "mood" of these
schemes might have the intended effect. In any event, though perhaps
counterintuitive, it should be clear in theory that allowing an agency to reverse
findings unsupported by competent, substantial evidence is more restrictive of its
authority than allowing an agency to reverse findings unsupported by a
preponderance of the evidence.
242. John Bilzor et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
43 ADMIN. L. REv. 571, 721-30 (1991).
243. Donald Brodie & Hans Linde, State Court Review of Administrative
Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 537, 547 (1977).
244. The Model Act Creating A State Central Hearing Agency, proposed in
1997, leaves this issue to a State's APA or provisions of substantive law, but the
wording interestingly appears to create a "default" in favor of finality in the
absence of such direction: "In reviewing a proposed (initial, recommended)
decision or order received from the administrative law judge, the agency head or
governing body of the agency shall not modify, reverse or remand the proposed
decision of the administrative law judge except for specified reasons in accordance
with law." Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, Section 1-11,
Proposed Decisions and Orders, at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/alj.html.
(last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
245. Some jurisdictions have specific constitutional authority for the exercise
of judicial power by administrative agencies. Article V, Section One of the Florida
Constitution provides, "commissions established by law, or administrative officers
or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the
functions of their offices."
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judicial power to executive branch entities.246  The federal
government and each state must therefore determine whether, and
where, to delegate such power within these constitutional limits.
Some jurisdictions have sought to vest plenary adjudicatory authority
247in agencies. Others conversely have given full final order
authority to bodies external to the agency. 248 In delegating a portion
of adjudicatory power to centrally housed ALJs and restricting the
power of agencies to modify findings of fact contained in their
recommended orders, Florida has sought a middle ground. It has
attempted to grant the agency significant control over conclusions of
law beyond that which could be exercised if a court had conducted
the hearing, yet at the same time to provide an institutional check on
the concentration of power in the agency head.
It is, of course, impossible to ever empirically demonstrate the
"proper" balance between the legislative, judicial, and executive
branches. Florida's choice may be variously condemned by defenders
of executive prerogative, apologists of legislative authority, or
advocates of judicial power as going too far, or not going far enough.
From any perspective, however, consideration of how the
administrative law judge affects the institutional balance of power
within a jurisdiction is an important factor that deserves more
attention than it has received.
246. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
247. Asimow reports that the California Coastal Council hears every matter en
banc and does not employ hearing officers. Asimow supra note 171 at 1107. Other
California Agencies using ALJs may reject their orders. CAL. GOVT. CODE §
11517(c) (West 2004).
248. Perhaps the strictest scheme exists in the State of Louisiana, which not
only affords ALJs final order authority, but since 1999 has precluded the
governmental agency from seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision. 1995 La.
Acts 739; 1999 La. Acts 1332. For a critical review, see Jay Bybee, Agency
Expertise, AL] Independence, and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in
Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REv. 431 (1999). The statute
survived constitutional challenge at the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wooley v.
State Farm Insurance Co., 2004-CA-0882, Jan. 19, 2005.
